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The purpose of this thesis is to identify the factors that influence drug trafficking 
organizations’ motivations to diversify their operations. With that in mind, the thesis 
seeks to answer the question: What explains the patterns of the drug trafficking 
organization’s diversification? For this thesis, I have used sources found on corporate 
diversification, in addition to sources that I have found for three Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs): the Sinaloa, Los Zetas, and Tijuana, to highlight the 
similarities and the differences in patterns among the three. The thesis concludes 
that various factors allow the DTOs to diversify into new businesses. First, as is the 
case in Mexico, the state has to be weak to provide opportunities for the 
clandestine organizations to diversify. Second, DTOs find opportunities through 
economic globalization and abundance of organizational resources that they use 
to motivate themselves to diversify. Moreover, to acclimate to the ever-changing 
clandestine landscape, DTOs require a decentralized internal structure. DTOs diversify 
to maximize their ability to cross-subsidize their revenue to combat state 
suppression. Rather than using hard power to cripple the DTOs, the Mexican 
government needs to understand their operation to hit them where it hurts, in their 
profits, by better understanding their operation. 
  vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
  vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE ........................................................................................2 
1. The Government ............................................................................2 
2. The Scholars ...................................................................................3 
3. The General Public ........................................................................4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................5 
1. Diversification ................................................................................5 
2. Transnational Criminal Organizations .......................................8 
3. Structure of Organizations..........................................................10 
D. HYPOTHESES AND ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES ....................11 
1. Resource Exploitation Hypothesis ..............................................12 
2. Push versus Pull Hypothesis .......................................................13 
3. Weak State Hypothesis ................................................................13 
4. The Competition Model ...............................................................14 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................15 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ............................17 
II. SINALOA DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION ..................................19 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................19 
B. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND ...........19 
1. Internal Structure ........................................................................20 
C. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES ......................................................24 
1. Resource Exploitation ..................................................................24 
2. The Push and Pull ........................................................................27 
3. The Weak State ............................................................................29 
4. The Competition...........................................................................34 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................37 
III. LOS ZETAS DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION ..............................39 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................39 
B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................39 
C. INTERNAL STRUCTURE .....................................................................43 
D. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESIS .......................................................44 
1. Resource Exploitation ..................................................................45 
2. The Push and Pull ........................................................................46 
3. The Weak State ............................................................................49 
viii 
4. The Competition...........................................................................52
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................55 
IV. TIJUANA DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION ..................................57
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................57 
B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................57 
C. INTERNAL STRUCTURE .....................................................................59 
D. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESIS .......................................................62 
1. The Competition...........................................................................62
2. The Weak State ............................................................................64
3. Resource Exploitation and Push and Pull .................................67
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................68 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................71 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................71 
B. COMPARING STRATEGIES AND DIFFERENT RESULTS ..........72 
C. THE APPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS .......................................75 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................77 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................85 
  ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. U.S. Drug Market .......................................................................................25 
Figure 2. Arrest of Cartel Members ..........................................................................33 
Figure 3. Commodity Price Quotes for Crude Oil ....................................................47 
Figure 4. Territorial Ownership by Various Mexican DTOs 2011 ...........................53 
Figure 5. Tijuana DTO Internal Structure .................................................................61 
Figure 6. Landscape of the Mexican Drug Cartels in 2014.......................................69 
 
  x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xi 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1. Motivating Factors of Diversification ........................................................73 
 
  xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CO  criminal organizations 
COHA  Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
DTO  drug trafficking organizations 
EMPRA emerging markets political risk analysis 
FARC  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDI  foreign direct investment 
GAFES Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales 
ISIL  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
NAFTA The North American Free Trade Agreement 
NPR  National Public Radio 
PEMEX Petróleos Mexicanos 
PSYOPS psychological operations 
TCO  transnational criminal organization 
 
  xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Above all things, I praise God, the Almighty, for leading me in the right direction 
to complete this master’s thesis. He is the Rock, and I know He will always lead me 
beside the quiet waters. I would like to thank my wife, Si Jung, for her devoted love and 
patience. Her unconditional support and encouragement pushed me to be a better person 
day after day, through the good and the bad. In addition, I would like to give many thanks 
to Professor Diego Esparza. His continuous support to students, passion for teaching, and 
immense knowledge cannot be praised enough. He is a great teacher, but more 
importantly, a wonderful person. I would also like to thank Professor Thomas Bruneau 
for his role as the second reader of this thesis. His vast knowledge and expertise in all 
things Latin American is astonishing.  
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the United States and to the Navy 
for giving me this immense opportunity to further my education in an institution of such 
high caliber. Thank you. 
 
  xvi 





Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have become more diverse and complex 
than ever before. DTOs have taken advantage of economic globalization and the digital 
revolution, diversifying operations and increasing profitability through global trade, 
transportation, and money transfers to legitimize their prominent roles within the state.1  
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the factors that influence the DTOs’ 
motivations to diversify their operations. When I started this research, my goal was to use 
research that began in the late 1990s by scholars and non-government organizations on 
the diversification patterns of legitimate corporations to examine two national-level 
Mexican cartels, the Sinaloa and the Zetas, and a smaller cartel, the Tijuana cartel, to 
determine whether the cartels have similar diversification patterns. With that in mind, the 
thesis seeks to answer the question: What explains the patterns of the drug trafficking 
organization’s diversification?  
The thesis explains different factors that allow the DTOs to diversify into new 
businesses. First, it is necessary that the state be in a weakened condition. The research 
concludes that the landscape created by the weak Mexican state provides opportunities 
for the clandestine organizations to diversify. Second, the opportunities found through 
economic globalization and an abundance of organizational resources motivate the 
organizations to diversify, continuously funding not only their survivability but also 
immense profits. Moreover, this thesis concludes that as the DTOs diversify, in addition 
to external forces, the internal structure of the organization has to be decentralized to an 
extent, which allows the organization to acclimate itself to the ever-changing clandestine 
landscape.  
                                                 
1 California Attorney General, Gangs beyond Borders: California and the Fight against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Sacramento, CA: California Attorney General, 2014), 19.  
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B. SIGNIFICANCE  
Modern DTOs are unlike the criminal organizational groups of the 1980s and the 
1990s, wherein the groups were mainly large, concentrated on particular goods, and 
concretely structured. Today, the DTOs are significantly more fluid and adaptive. They 
behave more like legitimate corporations as they diversify their illicit, and licit business 
more than ever before. As the DTOs diversify—whether it be legally or illegally—one 
thing is certain: wherever the DTOs go, violence and havoc follows. So, why should 
people care that DTOs are diversifying? Why should the governments care, scholars care, 
and lastly, the general public care about DTO diversification? Reasons why these groups 
care are discussed below.  
1. The Government 
The diversification and expansion of the DTOs in recent years is a security 
concern for the governments of Mexico and the United States. In their rise to power from 
small drug trafficking organizations to the multinational organizations, DTOs have 
perpetrated acts of violence resulting in many deaths. Although the bulk of these deaths 
were due to intra-DTO activities, at least, 20 Mexican mayors, hundreds of military 
personnel, and hundreds of police officers in the line of duty have been killed in the years 
2000–2005.2 Also, although significant DTO violence happens within Mexico—mostly 
on the central Pacific coast and northern Mexico, out of which the majority of the larger 
DTOs tends to operate—the violence has raised significant and critical concerns among 
the United States government officials concerning possible violence “spillover” into the 
U.S. bordering communities.3  
In addition to the violence, the diversified expansion of the Mexican DTOs can be 
a potential risk to the U.S. economy as DTOs tend to penetrate the financial and the 
commercial markets. As stated by the National Security Council regarding this topic, 
DTOs “threatens U.S. economic interest and can cause significant damage to the world 
                                                 
2 David A. Shirk, Drugs Violence and State Responses in Mexico (San Diego: Department of Political 
Science, University of San Diego, 2012), 6.  
3 Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk, Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in 
the U.S.-Mexican Context (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010), 4.  
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financial system through its subversion, exploitation, and distortion of the legitimate 
market and economic activity.”4 Here, the concern for the government is that if these 
illicit organizations diversify out of their narcotics into more of a commodity-based 
industry such as oil, precious metals, and the transportation sector, their tendencies to use 
bribery and violence will significantly neutralize the government’s ability to act against 
them. The inability to contain the DTO’s expansion will surely diminish the economic 
competitiveness of the market by driving out legitimate businesses and possibly 
damaging legitimate economic growth.5 
2. The Scholars 
It is imperative for the scholars who study DTO diversification to understand the 
“organizational structures, potential sources of revenues, and recruitment mechanisms”6 
to be able adequately analyze the internal dynamics and possible motives for DTO 
diversifications. Unfortunately, for academics who are researching this topic, as the 
dynamics of DTOs are constantly shifting through economic globalization, so will 
scholars’ methods of research. Today, as DTOs are diversifying at an unprecedented rate, 
many analysts now refer them as a transnational criminal organization (TCO), not just 
DTOs. What is important and significant for scholars is that the dynamics within the 
DTOs have changed dramatically over the years. The change in dynamics has also made 
it challenging to pinpoint what these organizations are diversifying into, and through this 
diversification, how much money is generated through DTOs’ non-drug activities. 
Therefore, scholars continue research to better understand how individual DTOs are 
structured and how they operate is a significant step in discovering how they diversify.  
                                                 
4 White House, “Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International 
Security,” White House, accessed November 21, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat. 
5 June S. Beittel, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf, 6. 
6 Antonio L. Mazzitelli, Mexican Cartels Influence in Central America (Fort Benning, GA: Western 
Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011), http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/45, 17.  
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3. The General Public 
At the first glance to Americans living in the United States, the DTOs diverse 
activities seem very foreign and far away. However, for people residing in Mexico, this is 
hardly the case. In Mexico, as the DTOs, such as the Zetas, are diversifying their 
businesses into a new industries such as kidnapping and extortion. Accordingly, citizens’ 
daily lives are filled with terror and unpredictability.  
A DTO has two basic functions in the society: “It can offer a product that legal 
businesses cannot provide, and it can steal or extort.”7 To the general public, the types of 
product that DTOs offer is of a huge concern as they include drugs, gambling, pirated 
goods, prostitution, and immigrant smuggling. The second offering of the DTOs includes 
“kidnapping, cargo robberies, car theft, and bank heists.”8 According to Ioan Grillo, out 
of the two types of DTO offerings—granted all are harmful to the society—the first 
category is the least detrimental.9 He explains that although a firm’s diversification into 
resource theft or gambling is unethical, these diversifications mostly involve physical 
merchandises that are not always life threatening. He notes, “shakedowns and 
kidnappings, however, terrorize communities, scare away investors, and burn 
businesses.”10 
DTO diversification can potentially bring pain and terror to any involved 
community. There are multiple reasons why DTOs are more active in certain territories 
than others; regardless, as U.S. citizens, we cannot just sit and ignore the fact that DTOs 
just south of the border are more than capable of crossing the border when given the 
opportunity. Their reasons and methods of diversification require further study and 
should be one of our primary concerns.  
                                                 
7 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 
262.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
 5 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is ample literature on the Mexican DTOs and the process of corporate 
diversification; however, when it comes to Mexican drug cartel diversification, the 
amount of relevant literature significantly drops. Scholarly articles and books are 
available and comprise a significant portion of the sources used for my research. Also, 
several governmental reports and works by subject matter experts offer supporting 
materials to my research. By using historical information written on corporate 
diversification and correlating it to Mexican DTOs’ behaviors, structure, and operations, 
my intent is to bring the two bodies of literature together to discover motives for Mexican 
DTOS’ diversification and why some diversifications succeed and others fail. To 
accomplish this task, I will first elaborate on business diversification, then lead into the 
criminal organizations, and finish the literature review with the structure of the criminal 
organizations. 
1. Diversification 
The daily operations and the strategies of both Sinaloa and the Zetas cartels are 
difficult to understand. To better understand their diversification process, this section 
provides a quick review of the literature on corporate diversification to develop a 
framework for this study.  
The concept of diversification is yet to be clearly defined in the study of 
economics. Likewise, the researchers of this topic still have yet to come up with a 
consensus for defining diversification. For instance, Reed and Luffman point out that the 
term “diversification” has many different meanings that depend in which context the term 
is used. 11  An earlier definition of diversification by researchers such as Gort 12  and 
Berry13 define the subject as products and services across multiple industries or market 
                                                 
11 Richard Reed, and George A. Luffman, “Diversification: The Growing Confusion,” Strategic 
Management Journal 7, no. 1 (1986): doi:10.1002/smj.4250070104.  
12 Michael Gort, Diversification and Integration in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962).   
13 Charles Horace Berry, “Corporate Growth and Diversification,” The Journal of Law & Economics 
14, no. 2 (1971): 371–383.  
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boundaries. Likewise, Hoskisson, Ireland, and Hitt14 attempted to explain diversification 
as a particular investment or partnership enabling a central organization to grow and to 
reduce the overall risk of the business operations.  
In the simplest form, business diversification refers to a firm’s entry into a new 
market with which it is currently not associated. The overall scheme of diversification 
represents the company’s departure from the existing base of current operations—either 
through business acquisition or an internal strategy—in an effort to counterbalance the 
strengths and weaknesses of its current operating businesses. However, corporations 
occasionally venture into unrelated investments because of the potential of high-profit-
margin and their otherwise minimal resource demands.15 
The literature overview of the motives for diversification states that there are 
many possible reasons behind the diversification strategies,16 and due to this variety, 
researchers mostly argue the corporate motives are related to nature of competitiveness 
and performance. Montgomery lays out three comprehensive schools of thoughts that 
bring together a number of separate points. The first school of thought is the market 
power view.17 It argues that a firm will “thrive at the expense of non-diversified firms not 
because they are any more efficient, but because they have access to what is termed 
conglomerate power.”18 In other words, market-power synergy is created if individual 
units within the diversified corporation balance one another by offering consumers one-
stop-shop experience. Scholar argue the only downside of this theory is that for a firm to 
be successful, the “firm must have some measure of strength in its individual markets.”19 
Simply put, firms diversify to gain additional market power. If a company is in an 
                                                 
14 Michael Hitt, Duane Ireland, and Robert. Hoskisson, Strategic Management: Competitiveness and 
Globalization: Concepts (Mason, OH: Thompson South-Western College, 2014).  
15 Caron H. St. John, and Jeffrey S. Harrison, “Manufacturing-based Relatedness, Synergy, and 
Coordination,” Strategic Management Journal 20, no. 2 (1999): 129–145. doi:10.1002/1097-
0266(199902)20:23.0.co;2-f.  
16 Cynthia A. Montgomery, “Corporate Diversification,” Journal of Economic Perspective 8, no. 3 
(1994): 164.  163–178.  
17 Ibid., 165.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
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insignificant position in any of its current operating markets, it will not have the 
conglomerate power, which increases its chance of failing in the new market.  
The second school of thought proposed by Montgomery regarding firm 
diversification is the agency view. According to Montgomery, several motives behind 
diversification from an agency perspective will not benefit the principal. Here, the main 
argument is that within the firm, there may be a separation between the owner and the 
manager (i.e., the manager does not own any equity of the company). According to 
Matsusaka, a corporate organization expert, the agency view within diversification is 
predominantly based on the idea that because of diffused ownership arises between the 
owner and the managers; the business ownership has neither incentive nor any method to 
monitor and discipline its managers.20 The perspective is that the managers within the 
firms are left with the freedom to pursue their own personal goals, which might include 
“empire building, protecting their specific human capital from firm’s risk, and 
entrenchment.21 Shleifer and Vishny and other economic scholars argue that a company 
with significant disconnect of ownership increases the probability of managers pursing 
value-reducing strategies to further enhance their own personal objectives at the expense 
of firm’s profitability.” 22  In the case of the Mexican DTOs, the agency view of 
diversification could represent the behaviors of the Zetas as the core organizational 
structure evolves around rapidly expansion of its “cells” that analysts call “clustered 
hierarchy.”23 
Besides the self-interest of empire building by the managers, the agency view 
theory proposes additional reasons for why managers may pursue firm expansion. As the 
organization ages and diversifies, the manager, as a rational human being, may opt to 
direct the firm’s diversification to increase the demand for the particular skills that the 
manager has. Again, Shleifer and Vishny term this sort of behavior as “managerial 
                                                 
20 John G. Matsusaka, “Corporate Diversification, Value Maximization, and Organizational 
Capabilities,” The Journal of Business 74, no. 3 (2001): 411, doi: 10.1086/321932.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, “Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: Evidence and 
Implications,” Strategic Management Journal 12, no. S2 (1991): 51–59. doi:10.1002/smj.4250121005.  
23 Mazzitelli, Mexican Cartels, 21.  
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entrenchment.”24 They argue that the managers of the firms in search of managerial 
entrenchment will often over-invest beyond the firm’s value-maximizing level. Likewise, 
another reason for diversification in the views of managers is in effort to reduce the risk 
of the firm, thus reducing their unemployment risk.25 By expanding the firm into many 
different portfolios, the job security of the managers will increase. 
Third and lastly, there is the resource view of diversification. The idea of the 
resource view suggests that the bundled resources and capabilities of the firm that are 
combined as time goes on directly reinforce the firm’s competitive advantage. Here, the 
theory is that if the firm has some sort of underused resources (e.g., the established drug 
trade routes of the Sinaloa cartel) that can be gainfully employed for additional revenue, 
it has a reason to expand. The profit generated by the successful growth will be more than 
likely underused and eventually used to grow and fund its diversification into new sector 
of the market.  
2. Transnational Criminal Organizations 
Today, transnational criminal organizations (TCO) are very active in different 
parts of the world, seeking out vast opportunities where the risk of difficulties is low. 
Here, the concept of crossing borders to generate profit through illicit means is nothing 
new. Therefore, it is a good idea to understand the TCOs’ markets and hierarchies and 
how they differ from legitimate transnational organizations.  
In his 1973 seminal essay, “Transnational Organizations in World Politics,” 
Huntington states that transnational organizations carry out key directed operations in 
multiple nations, mobilize new resources, and follow improving strategies across national 
boundaries.26 Collaboratively, the main features of transnational organizations can be 
applied to criminal organizations, such as the Sinaloa and the Zetas cartels. However, as 
                                                 
24 Shleifer, and Vishny, “Takeovers,” 137. 
25 Montgomery, “Diversification,” 166.  
26 Samuel Huntington, “Transnational Organizations in World Politics,” World Politics 25, no. 3 
(April 1973), 340.  
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much as there are similarities between the two, the legality factor, enforced by the state 
governments, is different. As noted by Samuel Huntington: 
In most instances, a transnational organization can conduct its operations 
only with the approval of the government claiming sovereignty over the 
territory in which it wishes to operate. Consequently, the transnational 
organization and the national government have to reach an access 
agreement defining the conditions under which the operations of the 
former will be permitted on the territory of the latter.27 
As stated by Huntington, a legal organization has to follow governmental rules 
and regulations to conduct business as a corporation. However, that is where the 
difference between the legal and illegal entity occurs. According to Nieto-Gomez, 
transnational criminal organizations, such as the Mexican DTOs, are significantly 
unobstructed by regulations imposed by the state government and “supply and demand of 
the criminal products or services dictate the price.”28 Moreover, criminal organizations 
function not as a body that will typically bargain access agreement to operate in a 
particular territory like a legal corporation, but in a strategic, whatever-it-takes effort to 
avoid government confrontations as much as possible to continue with illicit activities. In 
some cases, with the Mexican drug cartels, they take great effort to persuade state 
officials through usage of bribes to achieve “institutionalized corruption.”29 In effect, this 
opens new doors to new diversification and allows them to conduct clandestine activities 
within state territories without much interference. 
Max Weber defined a central feature of modern statehood as “the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within given territory.” 30 In contrast to Weber’s 
definition of a state, analysts have witnessed cases in which for the Mexican cartels, there 
is no need for an agreement with the state officials—mostly because the Mexican states 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 355.  
28 Rodrigo Nieto Gomez, The Geopolitics of Clandestine Innovation in the Drug Business. A 
Framework of Analysis to Understand Adaptation Capacities of TCOs (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2013), https://medium.com/@rodrigonieto/the-geopolitics-of-clandestine-innovation-in-the-drug-
business-a07efe494035#.i9ijxyxcn, 4.  
29 M. E. Newhouse, “Institutional Corruption: A Fiduciary Theory,” Cornell Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 23, no. 3 (2014): 553, 554, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2335619.  
30 Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.  
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seriously lack of legitimacy and lack of ability to stop criminal activities in the 
hinterlands. According to scholars, the lack of state legitimacy in the periphery mostly 
occurs in developing states in transition.31 
3. Structure of Organizations 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the criminal 
organizations today are not the same as the organizations that we once knew as the mafia. 
With the growth of economic globalization, a crucial concern of the organized crime 
analysis is to figure out how organized the current illicit firms really are. According to 
Williams, there are two opposing patterns.32 The traditional model of organized crime is 
what he calls a mafia model. Here, as it was once understood of the Mexican DTOs’ 
organizational structure, “the major components are a clear-cut hierarchy, well-defined 
role specialization within the hierarchy, the exercise of control, authority and initiative. . . 
. Attempt to establish monopoly control over illicit markets, the use of violence and the 
use of corruption.”33 On the opposite side of the spectrum is the market paradigm model, 
best represented by Peter Reuter, which proposes that the world of organized crime as 
disorganized and that the illicit markets operate, for the most part, like any other market 
utilizing the concept of supply and demand. 34  This is what we are witnessing with 
Mexican DTOs today.  
However, researchers today are observing what appears to be a third pattern for 
understanding organized crime. As described above, traditionally large, illegitimate 
organizations conducting business in given territories were relatively easy targets for 
authorities and easily dismantled by external forces. What the researchers are currently 
finding is that organziations, such as the Mexican DTOs, are considerably looser and less 
                                                 
31 Erica Marat, “Impact of Drug Trade and Organized Crime on State Functioning in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2006), 
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32 Phil Williams, and Dimitri Vlassis, Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities, and 
Responses (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 72. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
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formally structured organizations than before. This makes DTOs more resistant to 
dismantlement and harder to contain as a whole.  
Unfortunately, as academic analysts have found, law enforcement agencies are 
still inclined to treat organized crime as the old centralized hierarchies. It is vital to 
understand is that organizations, such as the Sinaloa and the Zetas cartels are 
sophisticated firms that are extremely fluid and capable of adapting to the changing 
environments, and therefore, our understandings of the illicit firms must change. David 
Ronfeldt of the RAND Corporation has stated that over time, societies have been 
dominated by tribes, hierarchies, and markets; however, as humans progress, the new 
tribes have just gotten better and are more effective and efficient, at what they do. 
Ronfeldt argues that the current society values the networks of organizations, and these 
systems in societies have significant advantages over more traditional bureaucratic 
hierarchies.35 
What we have discovered so far is that transnational criminal organizations, such 
as the Mexican DTOs, lack the formal structure of the legitimate transnational 
corporations. Still, many of the criminal organizations behave similarly to the legal 
transnational corporations. For example, they normally have a home base in one country 
and operate across multiple national borders to conduct diversified operations. The home 
territory more than likely is a safe haven that provides a low-risk environment, as the 
state in the home country is weak, compliant, or plainly corrupt. Conducting their 
operations from these safe-havens allows these firms to fulfill the demands for illegal 
products and continuously smuggle the goods using the path of less resistance.  
D. HYPOTHESES AND ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
Economic globalization stimulates business diversification and has enabled the 
rapid growth of licit, international trade all around the world. These economic 
phenomena have also facilitated the rise of illegal commerce and the criminal enterprise 
engaging in illicit activities. Frankly, one cannot automatically assume that the growth of 
                                                 
35 David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks: A Framework about Societal Evolution 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7967.html.  
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transnational organized criminal firms mirror the full globalization side of the spectrum 
as not all have the will nor the capacity to exploit the new opportunities that may be 
presented. Here, for various reasons, researchers recognize that some of the DTOs are not 
motivated to diversify and instead remain localized in their operation.  
Knowing this, I propose three hypotheses: 1) resource exploitation, 2) push versus 
pull, 3) weak state. I also propose one alternative hypothesis: the competition hypothesis. 
Both my hypotheses and hypothesis are tested in terms of the language of observable 
implications witnessed with the DTOs currently active in Mexico to determine why some 
criminal organizations decide to diversify their product portfolio while other do not.  
In this thesis, I argue that DTOs are motivated to diversify because of three 
different hypotheses. Primarily, the background condition of a weak state must be in 
place before DTO diversification can take place. Without this baseline condition, the 
level of diversification opportunities is low for the DTOs. Second, as the DTOs slowly 
gain momentum and increase their assets, the underutilized resources will motivate them 
to diversify. Third, and lastly, the economic globalization within the society either pushes 
or pulls the DTOs to diversify into a new sector of the market. As the licit market grows 
through globalization so does the illicit, clandestine market growth. 
1. Resource Exploitation Hypothesis 
The resource exploitation hypothesis suggests that if DTOs have any 
underutilized resources, such as the drug trafficking routes or a specialization that could 
be used to generate additional income, they will be motivated to diversify. For the DTOs, 
as for legitimate corporations, underused resources are wasted and do not generate any 
additional profits. To maximize benefits, the DTOs, as would a legitimate corporation, 
will seek out opportunities through their already implemented infrastructures and exploit 
the opportunities to best of their ability.  
The observable implications for this hypothesis may be the rise of smuggling 
business other than the trafficking of drugs that utilize the networks of drug trafficking 
routes already established. For the DTOs, it makes sense to know that the routes that they 
currently use or the lands that they currently own could be utilized for many different 
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activities other than drugs. Here, the rise of smuggling activities, such as illegal migrants, 
firearms, and sex trafficking, could be a sign that the DTOs are exploiting its 
underutilized resources and thus potentially diversifying business into new industries.  
Hypothesis (H) H1: DTOs diversify to fully maximize its underutilized resources. 
Therefore, if the firm has the will and the resources, it will want to branch out to other 
sectors of the market that could benefit from its current underused resources. 
2. Push versus Pull Hypothesis 
In today’s globalized economy, states seek economic development to be 
competitive. Unlike in the past where the DTOs were pushed into doing one thing—
trafficking of drugs—now, as countries like China are demanding more raw materials to 
grow their infrastructure, and they desire to obtain natural resources as cheaply as 
possible. Contrary to in the past, today, the DTOs are pulled into new industries as a 
means of diversification. As demand for natural resources such as iron ore and oil 
increases, the DTOs will quickly recognize the demand and do whatever it is necessary to 
enter the market—if that means being pulled into new, unfamiliar industries. 
As the observable implication for the push versus pull hypothesis, more and more 
DTOs will move into unfamiliar territories to assist growth of world globalization by 
supplying goods at a significantly lowered price. The DTO diversification could be the 
act of extortion of local people in a specific industry or legally hiring the locals to 
produce a product that is in demand. One thing is certain, the majority of the industries 
(e.g., resource extraction, and manufacturing) that the DTOs are being pulled into are 
legitimate to some extent; however, the way the DTOs engage in their newly acquired 
industries will be illegitimate in nature.   
H2: The globalization will pull the DTOs to diversify into new industries. 
Therefore, the needs of the world will pull the DTOs to diversify into a particular market. 
3. Weak State Hypothesis 
Criminal organizations usually pose a significant challenge for all types of states 
and state governance. As DTOs gain strength and legitimacy through their ability to 
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overcome governmental efforts to shut them down, their natural behavior is typically 
hostile as they employ intimidation and violence against the government and even the 
local population as majority of DTOs are accustomed to using hard power rather than soft 
to achieve their goals.  
For the weak state hypothesis, the observable implications are the weak 
governance by the state of its territories. If the government cannot, or simply does not, 
have the capacity to offer its citizens the basic goods citizens require for their daily lives, 
it creates a vacuum, which the criminal organizations can fill. Moreover, due to the 
disconnection between state and population, the local officials and law enforcers are 
more prone to corruption. This corruption will ultimately decrease the government’s 
ability to make decisive action against the criminal organizations, giving the DTOs the 
incentives to take advantage of the weak governance and diversify even further. In 
addition, the DTOs diversification into legitimate enterprises further complicates the 
state’s ability to shut them down. 
Alternative hypothesis (AH)1: Weak states indirectly create a void that 
incentivizes DTOs to diversify. Therefore, if the state cannot provide the means to protect 
and serve its citizens’ basic needs, the DTOs are motivated to fill the vacuum created 
within the society. 
4. The Competition Model 
As it is nearly impossible to research every single DTO operating in Mexico to 
determine all motives for diversification, the hypotheses are my educated suggestions. 
Moreover, the competition model hypothesis may indeed answer why some DTOs in 
Mexico diversify, but for my testing, it was the least substantial. As the evidence 
supporting this hypothesis is not as strong as the evidence for the three main hypotheses, 
the competition model hypotheses is an alternate. 
According to June Beittel, an analyst in Latin American affairs, the current DTO 
landscape exhibits “more competition and more violence” than ever before. 36 As the 
                                                 
36 Beittel, Mexico, 22.  
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DTOs have fractured and become more diversified continuously over the years, the 
relative illicit activities remain the same while fracturing of DTOs will result in more 
competition and likely more violence within the clandestine landscape. DTOs are 
established to make money, and to be successful, they must compete. To accomplish this, 
DTOs have to exercise power and determine strategic ways to lower competition.  
For the competition model hypothesis, there are two possible observable 
implications. First, to further diversify, the organization has to be already established 
with enough cash flow to be able to cross-subsidize its new diversification. Without prior 
established source of income, a DTO’s motivation and the ability to diversify into a new, 
highly competitive market will be very slim. However, if the firm can take its proceeds 
from its core industry and has the ability to use the proceedings in its new industry to 
drive out the competitors, it has a reason to diversify.  
Conversely, as a second observable implication for the competition model, if the 
market already contains large firms that appear to be difficult to eliminate, the firm may 
still want to diversify into the industry. However, rather than competing and wasting 
resources, the DTOs may decide to work together through interdependence. If one 
witnesses multiple, large firms in the same industry without a lot of violence, they may 
be in fact working together interdependently.   
AH2: DTOs diversify because their goal is to minimize competition. Therefore, 
the firm will first try to diversify into a new market by eliminating the competitors by 
themselves. However, if determined that it cannot, it will try to form an alliance with 
other DTOs.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis draws upon the literature written in the field of opportunity structures 
and the most-similar research design developed by John Stuart Mill.37 For this thesis, my 
intent is to use a mixture of sources that I have found on corporate diversification, but 
more importantly the sources that I have found for two national level Mexican drug 
                                                 
37 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 209. 
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cartels, the Sinaloa and the Zetas, and one smaller cartel, the Tijuana cartel. By 
comparing three different cartels, my intent is to differentiate the similarities and the 
differences in patterns among the three. My choice of Mexican DTOs for this thesis is 
based on the fact that these Mexican organized criminal groups have evolved into an 
unprecedented threat to both Mexico and the United States. Today, the Mexican 
organized crime is not only about drug business. Unlike the centralized Colombian cartel-
style organizations, the Mexican organizations are morphing into something far more 
determined and dangerous for Mexico and neighboring states. 
The three Mexican cartels that I have decided to research fit perfectly with my 
research design because the national level cartels (Sinaloa and Los Zetas) lend 
themselves to comparison as they are very diverse yet similar in size. Moreover, the two 
cartels are different in that their initial formation and internal dynamics. Even though 
both the Sinaloa and the Zetas are categorized as national level cartels due to their size 
and tendency to control and maintain presence in specific valuable drug routes, the 
Sinaloa’s are specialists when it comes to drug production and trafficking. In contrast, the 
Zetas do not have a distinct specialization in any particular criminality.  
Conversely, unlike the previous Sinaloas and Zetas, the Tijuana cartel is 
considered to be a mere “toll collector.” It earns its incomes not as a diversified 
organization but as a drug corridor gatekeeper that is known to receive toll fees from 
other cartels that wants to use its border municipalities to send drug shipments into the 
United States. What sets the Tijuana DTO apart from other diversified DTOs is its area 
confinement. Unlike the Sinaloas and the Zetas, which can quickly isolate themselves as 
they see fit through diversification, the Tijuana cartel are mostly confined to its border 
municipalities—decreasing its likeliness of diversification into a new market.  
Here, my intent is to first compare the Sinaloa and the Zetas cartels. From there, I 
will compare them to the less-diverse Tijuana cartel to see if there are any significant 
patterns differentiations when it comes to DTO diversification. To best understand each 
of the cartel’s history, organization, and motives for diversification, I focus my research 
on most current online resources that provide the most up-to-date information on DTO 
dynamics. To understand the evolving dynamics within the each cartel, I researched news 
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sources from both Mexico and the United States. Additionally, I use U.S. state official 
publications that have ample information on the recent trends and occurrence of cartel 
diversification. Furthermore, for a broader spectrum of information, websites (such as the 
InsightCrime), U.S. governmental publications, and online news videos offer real 
investigation and analysis of organized crime in Mexico.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following the introduction chapter, which includes the literature review with the 
general background of corporate diversification and the transnational organized crime, 
Chapter II introduces the Sinaloa cartel. With the understanding of the corporate 
diversification process from Chapter I, Chapter II examines the background history of the 
Sinaloa cartel—the way it was initially formed and its organizational structure—to 
determine whether there are particular patterns of behavior or modes of operation that can 
be used to determine its diversification process accordance with my hypotheses.  
Chapter III examines the Zetas cartel. Very similar to Chapter II, Chapter III 
discusses the background of the cartel—more specifically its operation style, structure, 
and how it was initially formed as the protector of the Gulf cartel—to determine if any of 
its behaviors or structures particularly stand out as a determinant to its diversification 
motives.  
Unlike the national level cartels examined in Chapters II and III, the Chapter IV 
investigates the Tijuana cartel. The basic concept of this chapter is to compare the 
Tijuana cartel with the two different types of cartels within Mexico that may predict the 
future behaviors. As Tijuana cartel is known as the smaller cartel in Mexico that does not 
diversify in the extent of its national level cartels due to its limited reach, this chapter will 
compare the difference between the Sinaloa and the Zetas to the Tijuana to conclude that 
if the DTOs want to survive, it has to recognize both the internal and external 
organizational constraints and diversify. Finally, Chapter V ties my research together and 
draws an overall conclusion about the research question.  
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II. SINALOA DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the characteristics of one of the most successful drug 
trafficking organization in Mexico today, the Sinaloa Cartel. By analyzing how the 
organization was initially formed and how it presently operated in the clandestine 
industry, this chapter lays out the foundation for a behavior of a successful organization 
to be compared to Los Zetas and the Tijuana cartels that are examined in the later 
chapters. In this chapter, I argue that out of the proposed hypotheses, the current situation 
of marijuana legalization in the U.S. and the rapid expansion of global electronics best 
explain the reasons why the Sinaloa DTO is aggressively motivated to diversify into new 
business. The chapter first briefly reviews the background of the cartel, internal structure, 
and followed by the testing of the hypothesis to determine which factors motivated its 
actions to diversify to become one of the most successful drug trafficking organizations 
in Mexico.  
B. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND 
The Mexican Sinaloa Cartel is recognized by many as the most productive drug 
trafficking organization in the world. Patrick Keefe, a policy adviser to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, has stated that in today’s world drug market, the Sinaloa Cartel has 
grown to achieve a “market share of at least 40 percent and perhaps as much as 60 
percent.”38 Initially founded on the west coast of Mexico in the 1980s and formerly 
known as the Blood Alliance, today, the cartel generates a strong, multibillion dollars 
revenue through an underground drug industry of smuggling and trafficking numerous 
variations of narcotics that are imported mostly from various Latin American states and 
trafficked into the United States.39 To compare the annual percentage of diversified drugs 
sold by the Sinaloa Cartel to a legitimate corporation as a size comparison, experts 
                                                 
38 Patrick R. Keefe, “How a Mexican Drug Cartel Makes Its Billions,” The New York Times, June 17, 
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39 Stephen L. Mallory, Understanding Organized Crime (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2012), 68.  
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calculate that the Sinaloa Cartel’s annual revenue “of some $3 billion—is comparable to 
the net earnings to Netflix or, for that matter, to Facebook.”40 The sheer amount of profit 
that Sinaloa Cartel generates dwarfs many of other legitimate corporations that are in 
operation in the world today.  
The Sinaloa Cartel, led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, is known to be 
headquartered in Culiacan, Sinaloa, in the Pacific coast of Mexico. As one of many 
known talents of the Sinaloa Cartel, the organization has used its “charm”—or bribe—to 
establish an extensive line of an international network that functions across various 
continents. How the Sinaloa Cartel has edged compared to other similar DTOs is simply 
remarkable. With the established networks of global partnerships, the organization has 
used innovative and subtle capabilities that it has learned throughout the years 
successfully exporting narcotics to wherever there are demands for their drugs.  
Take the U.S. market for example. Unlike the some smaller DTOs that are limited 
to certain services and resources that they can physically offer, the Sinaloas are more 
resourceful, flexible, and, most importantly, more diversified than many of its rivals. 
They can adapt and rapidly distribute the products in demand to any of major cities 
around the United States. 41  The New York Times assessment evaluates “Guzman’s 
organization is responsible for as much as half of the illegal narcotics imported into the 
United States from Mexico each year.”42 Thus, the Sinaloas have positioned themselves 
at a national level drug trafficking organization and a group with which to be reckoned.  
1. Internal Structure 
The Sinaloa DTO’s success starts with an intricate organizational structure that 
has continuously evolved since its initial formation decades ago. The inner workings of 
the Sinaloa DTO have been described by many as a combination of factors, such as the 
continuous adaptation of its internal structure to meet the ever-changing clandestine 
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landscape and fracturing of the organization if deemed necessary for survival. Solely for 
this reason alone, experts state that other than the family-oriented origins, it is relatively 
difficult to pinpoint the exact membership of the current organization of the Sinaloa 
DTO; this makes it possible that many of its present day enemies were once its 
members.43  
Unlike the previous, Colombian cartels, studies over the years confirm that the 
Sinaloa Cartel is a “federation” and does not seem to be operating using a linear structure 
that it once did.44 In contrast to the older generation Mexican cartels, the Sinaloa Cartel 
has evolved from its once straight-cut internal structures to more intertwined networks 
that employ numerous leaders over several territories. Here, unlike what the popular 
culture leads us to believe, while El Chapo may be the face for the whole cartel, there are 
at least four drug lords within the organizational chain-of-command who dictate the next 
move. In addition to El Chapo, the known top chain-of-command of the Sinaloa DTO is 
Jesus Vincente “El Vincentillo” Zambada-Niebla, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, and Juan 
Jose “El Arul” Esparagoza Moreno.45  
An important aspect of the Sinaloa organizational leadership is that each of these 
capos (drug lords) is responsible for controlling, operating, and making important 
decisions on behalf of the whole group for a particular region. Moreover, as we have seen 
with the capture of El Chapo on a couple different occasions, this internal organizational 
structure creates a safety barrier if one of the leaders were to be caught and arrested, 
ensuring a successful continuation of the business without any gaps.46 As noted by El 
Mayo in a rare 2010 interview, “arrests have no effect on the cartel, and that its drugs 
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would keep flowing north even if El Chapo were brought down. When it comes to the 
capos, jailed, dead, or extradited, he said ‘their replacements are ready.’”47 
As stated before, the bloodline or the family-oriented structure is also the core of 
the Sinaloa’s daily corporate operations. To ensure safety and security of the organization 
from sabotage or an insider’s attack, El Chapo is said to purposely integrated the family 
structure into his business organization. To further spread Sinaloa DTO’s global 
presence, El Chapo has aligned the organization with localized gangs and DTOs within 
its interested territories. By affiliating with other DTOs, such as the Beltran-Leyva 
brothers and localized gangs, the Sinaloa DTO continues to suppress its competition 
successfully. While the smaller groups may benefit from the Sinaloa Federation in the 
form of monetary support and representation, the Sinaloa Cartel is the biggest beneficiary 
of these agreements.  
Moreover, to its advantage, the organization’s decentralized internal efforts to 
increase affiliation with other groups further contributes to the weakening the state’s 
ability to enforce law and order—further legitimizing Sinaloan presence and behaviors 
globally. The continued enlargement of the Sinaloa Federations through the intermixing 
of its associates makes the pinpointing of a specific Sinaloa Cartel perpetrator by 
authorities that much more challenging. This dramatically benefits the principal Sinaloa 
members and insulates them from apprehension. 
Not surprisingly, violence and threat are typically known as two of the best and 
widely used weapons of the DTOs; however, the Sinaloa DTO is somewhat different. Its 
modus operandi, unlike some of other bodies such as Los Zetas, is all about the covert 
trafficking of narcotics to make a profit without drawing unnecessary attention.48 As a 
national level cartel trafficking drugs through any means necessary, the Sinaloa cartel 
prefers to work with a mentality of “bribe over bullet.”49 The organization’s prefernce for 
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bribery over violence mentally separates the Sinaloa members and its leadership from 
other groups in the underground landscape. While other DTOs typically opt for the use of 
brute force to achieve its objectives, the Sinaloa organization prefers to open up its wallet 
and pay of the officials to get what it wants without causing unnecessary bloody violence. 
The core values of the organization’s bribing mentality may be the key to the cartel’s 
diversified growth as “a cartel cannot flourish at their level without civil and military 
protection at the highest levels,”50 said Jorge Carrasco, who covers organized crime for 
the respected Mexican newsmagazine Proceso. Proceso recently published with Guzman 
Loera (El Chapo) on the cover with the title “The Untouchable.”51  
As the magazine Proceso has illustrated, El Chapo has an image of being 
untouchable in Mexico because of his experience and the extent of the influence the 
Sinaloa Cartel has over the Mexican state officials. Given the preference of bribery by the 
Sinaloa organization, the police and the legal officials are constantly bribed by the 
organization—some even flat out belonging on its payroll. 52  Interestingly enough, 
already infamous for being corrupt, Mexican police officers were recently blamed for 
committing the crime on behalf of the Sinaloa Cartel—further legitimizing that the modes 
of operations of the Sinaloa Cartel is working. As stated by Ted Carpenter regarding the 
bribing of officials, “At one point, more than seven hundred officers were charged with 
offenses ranging from taking bribes to drug-related kidnapping and murder.” 53  The 
Sinaloa Cartel spends astronomical amounts bribing the Mexican and foreign officials to 
safeguard its interests and to gain protection. This informal agreement, if successfully 
aligned with the cartel’s overarching mission, will further assist in Sinaloa’s efforts of 
diversification of its drug and vice types of activities.  
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C. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES 
As stated in Chapter I, through the process of integration, the economic 
globalization has enabled the rapid growth of the licit transnational business all around 
the world. This economic phenomenon has also facilitated the rise of illegal activities, 
such as human and sex trafficking, conducted by the criminal enterprises. Although it is 
hard for me to conclude that the Sinaloa DTO’s way of diversification is to mimic the 
business process to a legitimate corporation, my intention through these four hypotheses 
is for one to better understand the behaviors and the motives of the Sinaloa DTO when it 
comes to business diversification in the hyper-competitive clandestine market.  
1. Resource Exploitation 
The resource exploitation hypothesis accepts that the reason why Sinaloa DTO 
diversifies its business portfolio is due to the excess resources, such as the drug 
trafficking routes, which could be generating additional profit that would otherwise go to 
waste. By examining the past and the present day drug consumption statistics in United 
States, one could assume that combination of war on drugs and the legalization of 
marijuana could equate to the underutilization of already existing drug smuggling trails, 
thus encouraging the Sinaloa Cartel the need to diversify into other business to fill the 
underutilized resources.  
It is no coincidence that all of the Mexican DTOs want to control the U.S. and 
Mexico bordering plazas to traffic illicit goods into the United States. After all, the single 
biggest consumer of the narcotics continues to be the United States. 54 Although the 
statistics show that the overall consumption of drugs has decreased over the years thanks 
to increased drug awareness, the niche market—the hardcore drug users—are still known 
to be heavily purchasing drugs. Combining the recreational and the hardcore drug users, 
the U.S. “spends on the order of $100 billion annually” 55 on illicit drugs, specifically 
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four different types of illicit drugs: cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin.56 
Many of these are a specialty of the Sinaloa Cartel. To generalize the sales of each 
particular drug that are sold in the U.S. each year, Figure 1 breaks down each of the 
four drugs into sales and the frequency of usage by the users. 
Figure 1.  U.S. Drug Market57 
Figure 1 shows the reader the bestselling item within the DTOs is marijuana. 
However, as difficult it is to seize the northward trafficking of drugs in exchange of 
southward movement of guns and dollars, the trend is that the sales of marijuana in recent 
years seem to be drastically decreasing. According to statistics by the U.S. Border Patrol 
regarding border drugs seized, the interception of northbound marijuana from 2011 to 
2014 declined from 2.5 million pounds to 1.9 million pounds.58 Experts now believe that 
the reduction in marijuana seizure at the U.S. and Mexican border has little to do with 
56 Ibid. 
57 Source: Beau Kilmer et al., How Big Is the U.S. Market for Illegal Drugs? (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2016).   
58 Ioan Grillo, “U.S. Legalization of Marijuana Has Hit Mexican Cartels’ Border Trade,” TIME, April 
8, 2015, http://time.com/3801889/us-legalization-marijuana-trade/.  
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law enforcement, rather it has a significant correlation with the legalization of marijuana 
in certain U.S. states to certain degrees. 
For the Sinaloa Cartel, the legalization of marijuana in certain U.S. states is a 
massive blow to its profits. The significance of its profit cutting due to legalization can be 
seen by how much the organization is paying the growers of marijuana. In an interview of 
former Sinaloa marijuana grower, “two or three years ago, a kilogram [2.2 pounds] of 
marijuana was worth $60 to $90 a kilo. . . But now they’re paying us $30 to $40 a 
kilo.”59 Despite the drop in sales of marijuana and other types of drugs over the years, a 
critical problem that requires attention are the creation of inefficiencies that are created 
within the drug trafficking trails as the quantity of demand decrease.  
So, in a sense, what the Sinaloa Cartel is doing is something very similar to 
United States Postal Service or Amazon.com does—it is mainly selling a logistics 
service. For a sophisticated organization such as the Sinaloa, which is famous for 
building extravagant smuggling trails and tunnels, the possibilities and profitability of its 
extensive networks of logistics are endless. There is no question that decline in marijuana 
sales in the United States has hurt the organization; however, such detrimental hurdle in 
addition to the capture of El Chapo is not slowing down the organization. As stated by 
the U.S. Attorney Laura Duffy of southern California, since 2006, the authorities have 
discovered more than “75 cross-border smuggling tunnels,”60 built by the Sinaloa DTO 
alone. Moreover, many of the tunnels discovered by the authorities are not regular 
tunnels that are made to smuggle drugs solely across the border. For the Sinaloa Cartel to 
successfully recoup some or all the losses occurred by select U.S. legalization of 
marijuana, for instance, the organization—which is well known for its smuggling 
tunnels—built “super tunnels” that are said to be in “length of eight football fields, from 
Tijuana warehouse to a San Diego warehouse,”61 with built-in arrangements such as a 
rail system, an oxygen ventilation system for proper breathing, and re-enforced structures 
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for added support for smuggling of drugs, offering a business diversificaiton—smuggling 
of humans.62 
To El Chapo’s Sinaloa Federation, the additional diversified product offering of 
human smuggling in addition to human trafficking utilizing the organization’s already 
complex drug trafficking routes makes perfect sense. Because the sales of the drugs in 
recent years has intensely decreased—mainly due to legalization and increased 
competition—the Sinaloa Cartel successfully diversified taking advantage of its 
economies of scope. The organization’s hope is to introduce its already established 
network of drug trails into other markets—in this case human smuggling. Having 
invested time and resources to build them up, El Chapo and his top capos are not 
disposed or close off the drug trafficking routes of its business just because of 
implementation of new external hurdles. Therefore, using the diversification strategy 
effectively, the Sinaloa Cartel may find alternative ways to utilize all of its current 
capabilities and resources in the near future. This makes the resource exploitation 
hypothesis very plausible in the Sinaloa context.  
2. The Push and Pull 
As the world becomes increasingly more globalized due to increasing usage of 
mobile phones and a vast array of electronic devices, there will continuously be an 
opportunity to make money on the supply-chain side of the business. It just depends on 
who finds the niche opportunity and how they take advantage of it. 
Interestingly enough, rather than seeking additional diversified possibilities in the 
drug-related field, the Sinaloa Cartel has found a niche market in the coltan mining sector 
of the economy. Coltan, a mineral generally found in “war-torn Central Africa” 63 and 
many parts of South America, is heavily relied upon by today’s growing electronic 
industry. Coltan is used as a conductor as it can “hold and move electrical signals, and its 
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conductive ability in extreme temperatures,”64 which makes it an ideal source for mobile 
devices used by billions today. Here, as the United States prohibits domestic firms from 
purchasing coltan from mines ran by criminals or terrorist organizations through the 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,65 there is a concern that due to loss of 
revenue through the legalization of marijuana in certain U.S. states, the Sinaloa Cartel is 
being pulled into the illegal ore mining industry to offset some of the cost of losses in the 
marijuana industry. 
By correctly recognizing the niche market in today’s economy, the Sinaloa Cartel 
is pulled into a new diversified market and now supposedly working side-by-side with 
the Fuerza Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia to exploit the 
valuable natural minerals. While Sinaloa’s diversification into the coltan market was due 
to the growth of modern technology, which requires this particular ore, it is a gold mine 
for profit making. As stated by Colonel Hector Paez, an acting director of Colombia’s 
police division, to armed criminal groups, earth’s natural minerals return on average of 
five times the profits of narcotics, sometimes even fetching as much as 19 times that.66 
Moreover, while cocaine takes on average of six months to produce, two kilograms of 
precious earthly minerals can be illegally mined per day, 67  further satisfying the 
Sinaloa’s desire to diversify away from its core business of narcotics trafficking.  
It is hard to pinpoint how much profit the Sinaloa Cartel is generating from coltan 
mining with the collaboration with the Colombian FARC. Although Colombia’s geology 
institute Ingeominas only estimates that country’s possession is only five percent of the 
world coltan reserves,68 the country’s lack of effective policing and regulation opens up 
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an invitation to non-state actors such as the Sinaloa DTO. According to experts, to 
Sinaloa’s advantage, unlike the globally banned narcotics, the precious ores illegally 
mined are relatively easy to launder and put up for sale in a legitimate market. This act 
further legitimizes the desires for the Sinaloa Cartel to diversify. Due to negative 
circumstances with marijuana and the opportunities in Colombia with minerals, the 
Sinaloa DTO may feel enough market pulling power to diversify its business.  
3. The Weak State 
The weak state hypothesis assumes that the state’s capacity to effectively combat 
or defend off the Sinaloa DTO is deficient. A good way to explain this assumption is 
through Mallory’s enterprise theory. 69  This approach speculates in essence that the 
activities conducted by the DTOs are a result of a void that is created by the state as a 
result of unfulfilled public demand for its goods and services to live out their daily 
lives.70 It is important to understand that the reason organized groups, such as the Sinaloa 
DTO, endeavor itself into both licit and illicit undertakings is to meet the increasing 
demands of the consumers. For the Sinaloa Cartel to meet this high demand for goods 
and services, it is normal for it to adapt itself to take the opportunity presented by the 
weak state to maximize its earning profits. 
To clarify how the weakness of a state can encourage the Sinaloa Cartel to 
diversify, I use the case of the Mexican Ciudad Juarez. Although there are many other 
Mexican cities that I could have used instead, I believe that Juarez—known to DTOs as a 
gateway to the United States—sets a perfect stage to test out how the Sinaloa Cartel can 
easily tap into government’s weakness, its integrity. 
Ciudad Juarez, or Juarez to most, is a large an industrial city that neighbors its 
U.S. sister town of El Paso, Texas. Juarez is considered as the gateway into the United 
States because after the instatement of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Juarez quickly became home to “approximately 300 maquiladoras, or 
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assembly plants.”71 Also, Juarez is home to several border points-of-entry—a perfect 
ground for the DTOs to set up its smuggling business. Moreover, in 2008, there were 
more than 23 million people who crossed from Juarez into El Paso.72 The high magnitude 
of commerce in Juarez requires an extensive security capacity to control what and who 
goes in and out of the country.73  
To the Sinaloa Cartel, the ownership of the Juarez corridor is vital. Known as the 
“ground-zero” 74 in the underground criminal community, the ability to successfully 
control this gateway can very much put an organization on top, destroying others in the 
process. As one observer noted, “Ciudad Juarez is the most immoral, degenerate, and 
utterly wicked place I have ever seen or heard of in my travels . . . It is a Mecca for 
criminals and degenerates from both sides of the border.”75 Similarly, Mexican Federal 
Police Chief Facundo Rosas has stated, “If you control the city (Ciudad Juarez), you 
control the drugs.”76 
For one to fathom the Sinaloa Cartel’s overall control of Juarez, it is imperative to 
examine the situation of Mexico through the lens of state-society conflict. Starting in the 
days of the Spanish conquistadors, Mexican government has always had a difficult time 
controlling its peripheral regions.77 A state-society relation is defined as  
Interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how 
to exercise public authority and how people can influence it. They are 
focused on issues such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of 
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state and society, negotiating how public resources should be allocated 
and establishing different modes of representation and accountability.78  
As a result, the state and society together determines how the state exercises both the 
power and the enforcement of laws. Likewise, in the context of the Sinaloa Cartel and the 
city of Juarez during the Calderon administration, the combination of the Cartel and the 
state institution simultaneously created a perfect breeding ground, which was a stepping 
stone to cartel diversification. This has propelled the Sinaloa organization to be one of the 
largest criminal entities in the world.  
When President Calderon first took office in 2006, one of the first 
implementations of his administration was to utilize the state institutions to crush the 
DTOs that were causing havoc, both socially and economically, in Mexico. To 
accomplish this task, the president “dispatched military troops and federal police to 
confront narco-violence . . . followed by an additional 10,000 troops to Ciudad Juarez in 
2009.”79 The president’s overall objective was to establish the government’s position 
firmly as the power of the state. His overall effort to combat the DTOs—more 
specifically the Sinaloa Cartel as it was the largest organization in the territory—was very 
costly to both the society and to the state. As a result, “Ciudad Juarez experienced a wave 
of violence with spikes in homicides, extortion, kidnapping, and theft—at one point 
reportedly experiencing 10 murders a day.”80 Nevertheless, the signs of state pursuit of 
the Sinaloa Cartel showed. Within four years in office, Caldron’s administration has 
successfully “seized over 114 tons of cocaine, 11,000 tons of marijuana, 75 tons of 
methamphetamines, 100,000 drug-associated vehicles, and $1 billion USD in cash,”81 
and the administration’s efforts were showing promising signs of moving forward.  
Nevertheless, what is ironic about all these statistics is that on paper, through an 
aggressive pursuit of the Sinaloa Cartel, the state has managed a successful way forward; 
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yet, the reality was different. To the state’s dismay, the Sinaloa Cartel has remained 
dominant clandestine organization in the city of Juarez. The Sinaloa Cartel successfully 
challenges the state, further expanding its presence throughout different bordering cities 
to diversify its drug business.82  
The success of the Sinaloa Cartel can be attributed to the successful workings of 
the cartel and the state officials. As noted before, the Sinaloa Cartel directly pushes 
bribery as one of its most effective weapons in its arsenal. An analysis of DTO member 
arrest data, conducted by National Public Radio (NPR), concludes that through the usage 
of bribery, the Sinaloa Cartel has successfully achieved one of its missions. As seen by 
the percentage of arrested cartel members in Figure 2, the data illustrates that the 
crackdown of DTOs done by the Mexican government “has not hit the Sinaloans as hard 
as it has other cartels.”83  
Likewise, Mexican police and politicians are known to be highly susceptible to 
bribes. According to Transparency International, an agency that measures the level of 
state corruption, Mexico scored 35 out of 100 (zero being highly corrupt and 100 being 
very clean.)84 Moreover, when surveyed by the same agency of the public regarding the 
view of Mexican political parties and police of corruption, general consensus was that the 
public perceived them to be extremely corrupt.85 
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Figure 2.  Arrest of Cartel Members86 
 
 
The successful workings of the Sinaloa Cartel and the state can be traced back to 
NAFTA. The implementation of NAFTA, which brought in foreign direct investments 
(FDI), quickly decimated the Mexican state-owned economy. Moreover, instead of 
creating better opportunities for the Mexican population as NAFTA was originally 
intended, it destroyed their livelihood. With the implemetnation of NAFTA, the 
communal land sharing system known as “ejido”87 was discarded, and the only viable 
earning option was to work in the foreign-owned maquiladoras, which paid a mere six 
dollars a day, leaving many in poverty without much help from the state.  
Quickly taking advantage of the unfortunate situation, El Chapo, now seen as a 
leader figure by the regularly suppressed people by the weak, corrupt government, used 
his wealth to buy out many of the bankrupted factories in Juarez to set up both licit and 
illicit businesses without much interference from the state as a way to launder money.88 
For many of the unemployed, their priority was survival, rather than the morality of 
working for the Sinaloa DTO. With such following, the Sinaloa Cartel continued to 
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diversify business successfully into new drugs, such as methamphetamine, and placed 
newly hired employees on their payroll as opium farmers, drug distributors, drivers, 
chemists, informants, and as sicarios (hired assassins). Also, the Sinaloa Cartel 
successfully structured many licit type business to launder dirty money right front of the 
eyes of the weak Mexican government.89 As long as the Sinaloa Cartel has police and 
federal officials on its payroll, it will undoubtedly continue to diversify to make profit 
and to continue its prosperous empire.90  
The experiences witnessed in Juarez regarding Sinaloa’s diversification 
showcases that the weak Mexican state does motivate DTOs to diversify their business to 
meet the needs of the population demand. As evidenced by the actions of the Sinaloa 
DTO in Juarez and its success in corrupting the local government to dominate one of the 
more lucrative bordering cities in Mexico, the weak state hypothesis is a strong case in 
determining why DTOs diversify, but as it is a constant, it may be necessary but 
insufficient condition for perceived diversification.  
4. The Competition 
In theory, the competition model hypothesizes that the Sinaloa Cartel will 
continue to diversify into a new business ventures to minimize competition. To conclude, 
this hypothesis as plausible, it is important to understand that the Sinaloa Cartel will have 
to be already established in a thriving market and forcefully tries to diversify into a new 
business market either to create an alliance or to drive-off another cartel to gain 
conglomerate power.  
In the ranking of the most powerful DTOs in Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel is still 
considered to be the most powerful and influential.91 Unlike many of the other DTOs that 
are moving into non-drug related, illicit businesses for added revenue, the powerhouse of 
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the Sinaloa Federation still derives the bulk of its revenues from diversification of drug 
production and trafficking.92 The drug trafficking business is recognized by experts as a 
complex and precarious endeavor. The shipping of drugs mirrors that of licit 
commodities; the more complex the route and the more hands the commodity (or drug) 
passes through, the higher the price. In the drug trafficking business, such as the one the 
Sinaloa is involved in, each of additional territory or plaza that the drug product passes 
through that is not controlled by the Sinaloa increases the price—ultimately making its 
products less competitive. Therefore, to maximize profit most efficiently, Sinaloa Cartel 
has to expand out its reach—to Central America as an example—in order to reduce 
shipping risk for drugs imported from South America. Due to this economic reason, the 
organization has a reason to expand and have opportunities to diversify into additional 
localized product offerings.  
The Central America example is an interesting one; however, it is nothing more 
than preexisting evolution of the region. DTOs in Central America have been present 
from the days of Colombian DTOs trafficking Colombian cultivated drugs into the 
United States with routes through Central America. At the time of the Colombian DTO’s 
dominance, Mexican DTOs, such as the Sinaloa, were only considered as “donkeys,” not 
a major threat to the regional stability.93 However, after the deterrence of the Colombian 
DTOs, the dynamics of the region have evolved.  
More recently, Mexico’s fight against drugs, then led by Mexican president Felipe 
Caldron with the help from the U.S. law enforcement further jeopardized the safety of the 
drug trafficking in Mexico. Ultimately, this caused a side-effect phenomenon called the 
“cockroach effect.”94 As argued by Bruce Bagley, the cockroach effect notion derives 
from the image of the scattering of kitchen cockroaches when lights are turned on. 
Likewise, the Sinaloa Cartel, under the pressure from the Mexican government, has 
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“sought to move at least part of their smuggling operations from Mexico into neighboring 
countries.”95 
The form of the Sinaloa Cartel’s territorial expansion in its core echoes their 
operation within the Mexican territory and its consequent cannibalization of other DTOs 
operating within its boundaries. Here, the careful observation of the Sinaloa Cartel 
suggests that as a dominant drug producing and trafficking organization, the determinant 
factor of whether to diversify into other types of drugs and expansion of its presence to 
other territories is done to ensure its future prosperity in both developing and successfully 
trafficking the cultivated drugs into the U.S. and to other emerging markets. As noted by 
Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez, an award winning political analyst, the Sinaloa DTO’s 
successful diversification of product offering likewise is in direct relation of its market 
expansion and the “drug trafficking ridden violence,”96 which follows an organizational 
development to maintain “control over drug trafficking routes, points of entry and exit, 
and distribution markets.”97 Following the biggest drug seizure in Australia in June 2010, 
where the price of cocaine is “two to three times higher than the U.S. or Europe,”98 the 
Australian authorities confirmed the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel in its local market.99 
Likewise, two years prior, the Malaysian authorities seized a methamphetamine lab and 
apprehended a group who they believed belonged to the Sinaloa DTO.100  
As stated before, for the Sinaloa Cartel to successfully diversify and increase its 
capacity, the organization requires conglomerate power. However, the war waged by the 
government at all different levels against the Sinaloa Cartel has pushed the organization 
to find alternative ways to further improve its professionalization. In a fashion similar to 
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corporate mergers, one of the revenues that the Sinaloa Cartel has professionalized 
further is the outsourcing of many of its specialized services to its army of established 
local gangs. Although the main concentration of the Sinaloa DTO is drugs, the localized 
gangs provide the organization with many benefits to further legitimize its conglomerate 
power such as “drug-deals, enforcements, freight transport, distribution and sales”101 in 
addition to human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, mineral theft, and other types of 
organized crime activities in support of its main product, narcotics.  
In addition to Sinaloa’s sphere of influence throughout the world, its diversified 
activities indicate that the Sinaloa Cartel has to an extent, legitimized its conglomerate 
power within the clandestine market and for that reason alone, it has reasons to further 
diversify its product portfolio to stay on top. The Sinaloa DTO—unlike many of other 
Mexican DTOs—mostly profits from drug sales. For Sinaloa to maximize its presence 
and position within the clandestine industry, its most viable option is to consistently align 
itself with other organizations to fully utilize its resources and diversify its product 
offerings so as to continuously evolve and be step ahead of all the other DTOs in the 
market.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
The Sinaloa’s clandestine market constantly shifts parallel to the licit market. As 
the market takes a turn for a particular product, which hinders revenues, a corporation, 
even an illicit one, has to find new ways to balance its overall success. Sinaloa’s drug 
market is a significant portion of its overall success. However, as the legalization of 
marijuana takes place in the United States, it quickly needed to find an alternative market 
that could potentially use its already established resources to recoup some or all of its 
losses with the decline in the marijuana sales. In addition, the success of the Sinaloa 
rested on its keen ability to pay off state officials through bribing and usage of its already 
established networks of drug trails to diversify slowly into foreign territories and the 
mineral industry with the assistance from the Colombian FARC. With the desire to 
survive and stay on the top of the clandestine food-chain through its offering the 
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conglomerate power, El Chapo’s way of extending diversification of product portfolio 
was the only viable option. 
The final examination of the four hypotheses tells us that Sinaloa’s characteristics 
and actions are all applicable as an explanation of its motives to diversify. However, out 
of the four hypotheses, the current situation of marijuana legalization in the United States 
and expansion of the world electronics best suits the reason why Sinaloa DTO is 
aggressively seeking to diversify into new business. As the organization’s ultimate goal 
in the clandestine industry is continued survival, as one market loses revenue, the Sinaloa 
will quickly improvise its resources to seek new market to offset the loss. Likewise, as 
demands for a specific product goes up, El Chapo and his team will be highly motivated 
to fulfill the opportunity always to be a step ahead of the competition. 
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III. LOS ZETAS DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter of the thesis recounts the characteristics and the behaviors of Los 
Zetas drug trafficking organization. The cartel, which many still consider as the most 
terrifying organization that has ever existed in Mexico, still continues to hold its ground 
and uses military tactics in a similar fashion to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS).102 Similar to Chapter II, through the recalls of past organizational behaviors by 
understanding its formation and the internal structure, the chapter offers a base 
understanding of the organization to be compared to other cartels in this thesis to 
conclude potential motivating factors that leads the Zetas to diversify.  
The chapter briefly reviews the background of the cartel, its internal structure, and 
follows with the testing of the hypothesis to better understand the motivations that 
encourage the Zetas to diversify its business. In this chapter, I argue that Sinaloa and 
Zetas DTOs both diversify due to similar motives. However, as similar as they both are, 
Los Zetas, who are not as specialized as the Sinaloa DTO, have to rely on smaller and 
weaker organizations to earn their money. Therefore, as much as Zetas would like to be 
an independent organization for simplicity, the competition side of their business will 
have to always be a step ahead of everyone else for them to thrive.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Los Zetas, established in the late 1990s, is one of the most feared cartels in 
Mexico. It started when a group of defectors from the special operations unit of the 
Mexican army, known as the Airborne Special Forces Group (GAFES),103 were hired to 
protect the business and the livelihood of Osiel Cardenas Guillen, the founder and the 
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kingpin of the infamous Gulf DTO. According to Osiel regarding the decision to hire 
GAFES forces, he “wanted the best men possible”104 to guard him and his enterprise. An 
interesting fact relating to the start of the Zetas was that as the special forces organization 
that were originally trained to fight and to enforce anti-drug tactics against the Mexican 
DTOs were now part of an organization that supplied narcotics throughout the world.  
The formation of the Zetas was a new chapter in the Mexican clandestine 
industry. The Zetas’ members—unlike traditional cartel members—were professionally 
trained by the GAFES, which modeled its training style after the U.S. Special Forces.105 
According to Sylvia Longmire, a retired former special agent with the Air Force Office of 
Special Investigations: 
Reportedly trained at Fort Benning, Georgia, in special tactics, 
surveillance and counter surveillance, urban warfare, prison escape, 
hostage rescue, explosive use, and high-tech communications. This 
training, in addition to virtually unlimited funding and an arsenal akin to a 
small army, makes Los Zetas one of the most formidable enforcement 
groups in Mexico.106 
The professionalism taught through the military special forces training, now 
immersed within the underground industry, brought forth new tactics of barbarism and 
radical fighting techniques that the society has never witnessed before. The initial 
uprising of Los Zetas kick-started a new form of cartel and cartel brutality; the military 
tactics used by the Zetas continuously challenge the sovereignty of Mexico. More 
importantly, however, the violent influence brought forth by Los Zetas overall 
contributed to the Gulf DTO’s overall business interest. 
An important aspect regarding Los Zetas that one has to understand in the 
Mexican context is that as a branch of enforcers of the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas, eventually 
grew to a point where the parent organization had problems controlling them. Los Zetas’ 
capacity and brutal procedures went out of control after Osiel’s arrest in 2003 and his 
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eventual extradition to the United States in 2007. After removal of Osiel, Los Zetas “led 
by Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano and Jaime Gonzales-Duran . . . Forced their way into the 
upper echelons of the Gulf hierarchy and began their supply and distribution network.”107 
Moreover, with additional instruction from Los Kaibiles—former Guatemalan army 
commandos—Los Zetas was the first organization in Mexico to use the basic premise of 
the psychological operations (PSYOPS) to their advantage. 108  Their innovative, 
militarized characteristics further legitimize their street “cred” (credibility) 109  and 
branded their particular organizational image as separate from their parent organization, 
the Gulf DTO.110 As one U.S. official has stated, “The Gulf cartel created the lion, but 
now the lion has wised up and controls the handler.”111 
Unlike the Sinaloa DTO in Chapter II, from its geneses, Los Zetas organization 
has been using brutal violence and fear tactics to form the organizational image and to 
disseminate specific messages to other organizational entities. Distinctly different to 
many of its counterpart drug trafficking organizations, the Zetas are more of a 
transnational criminal organization (TCO) or criminal organization (CO) rather than a 
drug trafficking organization. They have become a huge threat to other DTOs in Mexico. 
As stated by El Chapo’s view of the Zetas for the Mexican people: 
Without the ‘Z’ you will live without fear. . . . If you are a Zeta, run 
because the MONSTER is coming . . . The new alliance have raised their 
weapons to f**k the Zetas because they have undermined the drug 
trafficking business with their kidnappings, extortions, etc. To sum it up, 
they don’t give a s**t about the freedom and tranquility of the Mexican 
people.112 
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The Zetas’ organizational image has in essence legitimized the existence of the 
Zetas and revealed to other DTOs that the rise of Los Zetas and their rapid diversification 
could potentially lead to concerns of rapid change of the clandestine landscape. However, 
the actual reason that Los Zetas have their hands in different diversifications is a result of 
a significant misfortune that occurred while being the right-hand protector of the Gulf 
DTO. Before the capture of Cardenas and his eventual extradition to the United States on 
charges of vice types of activities, Osiel “never tutored Los Zetas in Narco-
trafficking.” 113  Without the proper, secretive knowledge of narcotics-trafficking and 
without the contacts of the Andean and the Colombian suppliers—which are essential to 
run a legitimate drug-trafficking business—the only other method of generating revenue 
to further legitimize their existence was to maximize their business diversification into 
other vice types of activities.114  
It is interesting to note that the Zetas’ introduction to the Mexican underground 
industry did in fact directly affect the environment. Now, it is challenging for me to state 
that the rise in human deaths in Mexico the years after the inauguration of the Zetas was 
in direct relation to Los Zetas’ actions. Nevertheless, according to STRATFOR’s report 
on Mexico’s drug war, it recorded that starting from 2010, the year when the Zetas 
separated from the Gulf DTO, the numbers of reported murders raised significantly. 
According to the report, in 2006, the reported murder cases in Mexico were 11,806, while 
“subsequently, there were 10,253 murders in 2007, 13,155 in 2008, 16,118 in 2009, 
20,681 in 2010.”115 As stated earlier, it is impossible to blame the Zetas directly for all 
the murders in Mexico. One could only assume that the escalation of deaths could have 
been attributed by the uprising of the Zetas in Mexico’s all-against-all conflict between 
the “cartels vs. Zetas vs. the police, military, and increasingly, the state itself.” 116 
However, one thing is for sure. After the fragmentation of Los Zetas from the Gulf DTO, 
Mexico was witnessing more violent deaths. 
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C. INTERNAL STRUCTURE  
In a similar fashion to the Sinaloa cartel described in Chapter II, Los Zetas 
performs and behaves as an organization with a corporate vision that is beyond that of a 
typical street gang. The initial screening of the organization may have one thinking that 
as an organization would exhibit tendencies of rigidity due to the concrete hierarchical 
internal structure, which is similar to the military. Nevertheless, through more detailed 
examination of the organizational structure exposes that the Zetas are more structured and 
performs more like a corporate enterprise—a corporate enterprise structure that can 
function in both, small- and large-scale business operation over a large territory.  
As stated in the above section on the cartel’s background, the actual meat of the 
organization does not revolve around the drug trade; instead, it has developed around 
providing protection for the organizations that operate within its controlled territories by 
creating localized presence or “cells.” 117  Experts see the Zetas as a franchiser of 
business, such as how Burger King restaurants are franchises of the parent organization. 
In the lens of Los Zetas, the more franchises, or cells that one has in a given territory, the 
more cells can diversify into other businesses, ultimately bringing in more money for the 
parent company as “they take their money as a slice of the income of the local 
franchisees.”118 As stated by Mazzitelli,  
if the Sinaloa cartel has all the features of a traditional criminal 
organization, in the sense of aiming to ‘control the production, supply and 
distribution of a given commodity or service unlawfully,’ then the Zetas 
are much closer to a typical Mafia organization, whose aim is ‘controlling 
the supply of protection’ in the territory where they are established.119  
In their core of operations, the Sinaloa and the Zetas business practices are 
significantly polarized. Unlike the modified linear type hierarchy of the Sinaloa that is to 
an extent transparent, the Zetas’ hierarchical structure is not as well defined. Again, 
according to Mazzitelli, “their (para) military origin, the lack of specialization in any 
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particular criminal business, a few media reports and anecdotes on their expansion in 
Mexico and the region, seem to suggest . . . A kind of ‘feudal’ system model.”120 This 
feudal system that Mazzitelli is referring to is a progressive system wherein cells are built 
whenever the Zetas overtake a specific territory. They established a self-sustaining 
branch of operation, which does not always require full chain-of-command approval to 
conduct business. As referenced by Emerging Markets Political Risk Analysis (EMPRA), 
a political risk advisory group regarding Zetas structure 
is both rigidly hierarchical (original members were known as Z-1, Z-3, etc. 
according to their rank in the organization) while at the same time 
significantly decentralized. Regional bosses are relatively well-controlled, 
yet maintain a great deal of discretion as to how they will meet their 
annual financial goals.121  
Likewise, the self-operating cultures of each cell within the Zetas’ internal 
structure, in addition to the constant need to expand its territorial control to sustain the 
upkeep of the organization, will eventually lead to atomization and separation of 
individual cells. So far, Los Zetas’ gameplay of atomization through the creation of new 
cells has undoubtedly worked for the organization. The rapidly expanding cellular 
network leads us to believe that in the short run, if the Zetas can properly exercise the use 
of violence, the method of expansion will most likely work. However, as soon as the 
organization loses its ability to police each and individual cells, havoc could break loose. 
D. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
As stated previously Los Zetas organization is both similar to and different from 
the Sinaloa cartel. Through the testing of the following four hypotheses, my intentions 
are to note the subtle and major similarities and difference between the two national level 
cartels when it comes to their motivation for business diversification.  
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1. Resource Exploitation 
The resource exploitation hypothesis for Los Zetas agrees that the reason for 
diversification of their business portfolio is due to holding excess resources, such as 
territory, manpower, and physical assets, which could otherwise be generating additional 
profits. For Los Zetas, possessing vast amounts of tightly controlled territories, in 
addition to weapons and willing members who are committed to the organization, opens 
up additional criminal opportunities—such as kidnapping and extortion. These 
opportunities may provide Los Zetas the motivation to diversify to fill the underutilized 
assets.  
The tightening of pressure from the Mexican law enforcement and the military on 
the organization may be causing Los Zetas to diversify into new avenues to generate 
money. President Calderon has claimed that his administration’s success is the sole 
reason that the gangsters and DTOs alike are turning in desperation to extortion and 
kidnapping.122 However, for an organization such as Los Zetas, whose primary job is not 
selling drugs—abduction and extortion are both attractive options of diversification. At 
the end of the day, the extortion and kidnapping profits are very handsome. According to 
Segura of Reuters, “Tragic but lucrative . . . Extortion fees over the six months totaled 
more than a half million dollars—ranging from $200 to $85,000.” 123  Likewise, 
kidnapping can also be very lucrative if done correctly. Mexico, a country rampant with 
criminal organizations that will not hesitate to kidnap for a price, are demanding ransom 
payments upwards of $300,000 or more for victims.124 This is a figure that many times 
the victims cannot fathom and have no hope of paying.  
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If the Zetas control vast amounts of Mexican territory by collecting piso from 
smaller organizations and are constantly pressured by the government to seize drug 
trafficking operations, why not diversify into other means of profit? Moreover, with 
Zetas’ ownership of fighters who are willing to work, putting them to work to kidnap and 
extort businesses surely generates easy money. 
Los Zetas’ internal structure is also set up in a way that will benefit its 
diversification into kidnapping and extortion. Because the structured organization is a 
franchised style utilizing its individual territorial cells, the organization could potentially 
generate money when the individual’s cells make profits. Payments to the contracted 
killers who would commit crimes on behalf of Zetas would be kept to a minimum by 
“giving them [group members] permission to kidnap, extort and steal,”125 rather than 
paying them in cash up front. Moreover, on top of using the underutilized personnel 
within the organization, Los Zetas could also ramp up its ability to entice threat to state 
officials. Using the phrase “plata o plomo,” or “silver or lead”—refering to accepting a 
bullet(death) or a bribe—mentality much like other DTOs, it is recorded that local 
governmental officials and local level law enforcements look the other way.  
In the case of Los Zetas for underutilized resources, there is a high chance that 
they are in fact motivated to diversify into a new industry to fulfill their resources. 
Longmire writes that when kidnapped migrants cannot pay ransom to the Zetas, they 
offer the migrants the “opportunity” to work as one of its foot soldiers.126 Facts such as 
this are discouraging; however, looking at the situation from a business perspective for 
Los Zetas, it is another opportunity that they can take advantage to grow and to profit.    
2. The Push and Pull 
For Los Zetas, the diversification into the fuel theft industry perfectly 
complements to the economic push and pull hypothesis. For the push and pull hypothesis 
to be plausible, Los Zetas have to be either pushed or pulled into a specific industry due 
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to economic changes that are happening around them. For this hypothesis, I continue my 
examination, started in the weak state hypothesis section, of Los Zetas’ entrance into the 
oil theft industry.  
By examining the commodity price quotes for crude oil, shown in Figure 4, one 
can see the commodity price of oil had its share of ups and downs throughout the years. 
Overall though, other than a decrease in 2009, the oil price constantly stayed above $70 a 
barrel until mid-2014. 
Figure 3.  Commodity Price Quotes for Crude Oil127 
 
 
Due to the combination of high payout and the ease of accessibility of oil by Los 
Zetas, one could say that the high demand for oil—mostly from the United States, where 
roughly 71 percent of all Mexican oil ends up128—pulls criminal enterprises, such as Los 
Zetas who hope to find new means of revenue.129 David Shields, an energy analyst, 
believes that the black-market of oil theft is a significant area where the criminal 
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organizations can easily profit. He states that although PEMEX officials “insist they are 
losing less than 1% of their black gold to the bandits,”130 out of the overall PEMEX 
revenue of more than $100 billion dollars, Shields calculates that in practicality, the loss 
is around “$2 billion to $4 billion annually.”131 The truth is that the state simply does not 
have the capacity to police all the diversified activities run by the clandestine enterprises, 
perhaps leading PEMEX to downplay the significance of the oil thefts. 
The opportunities in the Mexican states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz illustrate a 
point for why Los Zetas are pulled into oil theft diversification. In recent years, the 
territories of Tamaulipas and Veracruz, which are controlled by Los Zetas, experienced 
significant growth in petroleum activities through government contracted “exploration, 
extraction, and production activities of existing oil and natural gas fields.” 132  Both 
Tamaulipas and Veracruz are major cash cows for Mexico. Tamaulipas is the sole 
location of the Burgos gas basin, which employees over 3,500 employees, and Veracruz 
produces over “755 million barrels of crude oil and almost six thousand cubic feet of 
gas.”133 Moreover, the port of Veracruz is responsible for the bulk of the nation’s export 
of oil through oil tankers, and the bulk of the state’s petrochemical, oil, and gas products 
eventually passes through the state of Veracruz to get to its final destination, making it a 
prime spot for oil theft.134 
With annual oil revenue figures upwards of $100 billion and ease of interception 
by the Zetas, incentive to diversify into the oil siphoning business is very high. Oil is a 
perfect commodity to steal by the Zetas. Unlike drugs, which will likely be illegal no 
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matter who sells them, once successfully introduced into the licit supply-chain system, 
the stolen oil can be processed through legitimate company’s refineries and legally 
distributed to be sold worldwide—further motivating Los Zetas to diversify. 135  This 
makes the push and pull hypothesis very plausible.  
3. The Weak State 
The weak state hypothesis assumes that the capacity of the state to successfully 
combat or defend the illicit acts of Los Zetas DTO is insufficient. Because the weak state 
provides a vacuum in the economy and society in which the DTOs can breed and 
flourish, first, Los Zetas must recognize the weakness, adapt themselves to meet the 
criteria to fill the void, and maximize their opportunities to exploit their earning potential 
profits fully. 
To examine the weak state hypothesis in Los Zetas context, I look into the fuel 
theft industry that is currently widespread in the state of Mexico. However, within the 
topic, I will be concentrating the weak state portion of the fuel theft, leaving the 
motivation to enter the fuel theft industry for the push and pull hypothesis later in this 
chapter.  
If anyone has studied or been curious about Mexico and its clandestine industry, 
the topic of fuel theft will surely surface. Ever since the discovery and the establishment 
of the state-owned petroleum company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), both the 
production of oil and its sales has been the center of the Mexican economy. According to 
the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) on Mexican oil, “profits on its extraction 
are the country’s number one revenue, accounting for approximately 40 percent of 
Mexico’s total revenues.” 136  The significance of this is that Mexico’s inability to 
successfully revenue from its oil production will considerably hinder its overall economy.  
Illegal tapping of the nation’s oil pipeline is an increased threat to the livelihood 
to many of the Mexicans who live and work around the pipelines and the refineries. As 
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the criminal organizations slowly get more creative and siphon out oil, the efforts put 
forth by the Mexican federal government seem to be ignored by the organized crime 
groups, such as the Zetas. As reported by an article in El Daily Post, this has potentially 
cost the Mexican government upwards of $1 billion dollars.137 Still, more important than 
the loss of revenue is the deaths caused by fiery explosions triggered by improperly 
tapping the pipelines by inexperienced, incompetent criminal members.138 As recorded in 
December 2010, a pipeline exploded after numerous tappings of the high-pressured oil 
pipelines owned by PEMEX139; the sources at the scene stated that the explosion caused 
an engulfing stream of black crude oil, which eventually sparked into “rivers of fire.”140 
The incident, which many blamed on Los Zetas, ultimately caused more than 20 deaths 
and injured more than 50.141 
For the Zetas, the accessibility of the national oil within its controlled territory, 
and the lack of ability for the Mexican authorities to successfully stop them, has created a 
vacuum that the Zetas are exploiting. In an article titled: “Mexico Fuel Theft: Big Earner 
for the Zetas,” Cawley records that due to lack of enforcement by the Mexican authorities 
to stop oil pipeline tapping, “the number of illegal taps discovered in company pipelines 
has risen 1,548 percent since the year 2000.”142 The shocking figure, which is probably 
underestimated, is simply difficult to comprehend. Likewise, to capitalize on this 
weakness, George Grayson states that Los Zetas take advantage of the inability of the 
authorities to threaten them and continue their vice activities. 143  Although illegal 
siphoning of PEMEX oil has occurred before the rise of Los Zetas, according to many 
experts, the significant spike in the quantity of oil theft started to increase in “PEMEX 
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facilities in Zetas-controlled states like Nuevo Leon and Veracruz.”144 These territories 
are the prime location where large numbers of oil thefts have occurred, and a significant 
percentage of arrests made in regards to oil theft were in some way tied to Zetas or their 
affiliated members. 
As explained above, the biggest motivation for Los Zetas to diversify into the oil 
sector besides the economic pull is the ease of accessibility and low levels of state 
punishment once caught. As noted by El Daily Post writer, Dwight Dyer, as the state 
increases the arrests made for illegal siphoning of state-owned oil, many simply find 
ways to sneak out of the punishment.145 He explains: 
On July 31, 2015, Sergio Meza Flores, an alleged tapping kingpin in the 
state of Tabasco, was arrested by Army and Federal Police personnel 
following an investigation by the Federal Attorney General’s Office. Over 
4,000 liters of gasoline, 25,000 liters of diesel and two tanker trucks were 
confiscated during the operation. However, despite the fact that the lower 
house of Congress stiffened criminal sanctions for fuel theft in November 
2014, he was released on bail by a local judge on Aug. 28.146 
It is difficult to prove that the local judge lacked integrity; however, as discussed 
in Chapter II on the Sinaloas, it is widely agreed that corruption of the state officials is 
very rampant. Like the Sinaloa DTO, through the use of petty corruption using the dirty 
money, Los Zetas are easily getting around the law. Similarly, without a secure, solid 
foundation of security in Mexico, the corruption will likely trickle down to the lowest 
positions within the PEMEX’s workforce—continuing to fund the Zetas while the state is 
consequently losing revenues that could potentially trickle down to the Mexican people 
and improve their wellbeing.  
In principle, past experiences with the weak Mexican state as shown through the 
example of state’s inability to stop and punish cartel members from illegally tapping oil 
pipelines sheds light into the motives of the Zetas. Whenever Los Zetas recognize the 
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weakness in the state’s operation, they will seek to capitalize on the weakness and 
quickly diversify before other organizations can get involved.   
4. The Competition 
In theory, complementing the model tested in Chapter II, the competition model 
hypothesizes that Los Zetas cartel will continue to diversify into a new business 
adventure to minimize competition. To conclude that the competition model hypothesis is 
an accurate prediction, the point to understand is that the Zetas will already have to be 
involved in a thriving market of their own and forcefully diversify into a new business 
market either to create an alliance or to drive-off another cartel to gain conglomerate 
power.  
In the world of Mexican underground industry, Los Zetas is a significant 
contender that relentlessly thrives on expanding its reach all across Mexico and beyond. 
An interesting fact regarding Los Zetas is the rate at which they have been expanding its 
diversified business. Unlike other DTOs in Mexico, Los Zetas organization at one point 
was known to be the king of the Mexican territory—prevailing in a minimum of 11 
Mexican states and operating in, “350 Mexican municipalities,” 147  as shown by a 
Mexican newspaper Excelsior in Figure 3. 
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Figure 4.  Territorial Ownership by Various Mexican DTOs 2011148 
 
 
Los Zetas way of competing with other Mexican DTOs for territorial ownership is 
relatively challenging to understand. Nevertheless, Steven Dudley attributes the success 
of the Zetas to their demonizing image and their lack of specialization in just one specific 
industry, as we have seen with the Sinaloa DTO with its drug trafficking. As stated 
previously, Los Zetas is cruel when it comes to business. Capitalizing on brutality, Los 
Zetas soon imaged themselves as the “lone wolf” organization within the Mexican 
clandestine industry—not looking to form any particular allies, just domination.149 It is 
recognized by experts that “Los Zetas go out of their way to preserve their independence, 
which allows them to react quickly to changing circumstances.”150 This indicates that 
independence may be the key to Los Zetas rapid success in business diversification. 
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To further endorse to their demonizing image, which has given the Zetas 
significant leverage over other DTOs, when Los Zetas took over an enemy’s territory, 
Zetas foot soldiers did not just cripple their opponents; they shattered them inhumanely. 
With the rise of Los Zetas, the old generation of the drug trafficking organization or as 
one would say the “gentleman’s organization” diminished. The traditional way of 
operating in the clandestine landscape; the “same way that the Italian Mafia did in 
America: family members were strictly off limits, and they didn’t mark anyone for death 
unless they had a plausibly good reason” 151 were gone. The times were changing with 
the new era of criminal organizations that systematically attacked anyone who as in their 
way no matter who they were. 
To test the competition hypothesis in the Zetas context, one needs to understand 
the Zetas mentality. Without alliances, how did Los Zetas grow so quickly? Again, 
according to Dudley, it is imperative to comprehend the Zetas origins and their way of 
looking at the business aspect of the whole clandestine landscape.152 Unlike many of the 
other DTOs in Mexico, which are operating similarly to a legitimate corporation using 
the expensive infrastructure of the business model of diversification, Los Zetas realized 
one thing: they did not have the infrastructure to run any particular business, unlike the 
Sinaloa. Due to this significant misfortune, the Zetas turned to what they were good at 
and capitalized on it. They used their primitive tactics to take over a territory and 
controlled the criminal activities that were held within through the usage of individual 
cells. 
To a degree, with the majority of the original 34 founding members either 
captured or killed by authorities, it is relatively difficult to parallel today’s Zetas to the 
initial group that founded it. However, through the years of recruiting degenerates and 
training them in the original, military style tactics, I can safely state that the militarized 
culture is still embedded within the organization and this makes their informal business 
tactics work. Utilizing a one-goal mentality and brutal schemes, Los Zetas can overtake 
an already established territory, and establish their own plaza to collect piso (rent money) 
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from criminal organizations that operate within their territory. By effectively enforcing 
their rule through force, Los Zetas, even without their own established infrastructures, 
can “diversify” their revenues by “extorting petty drug dealers, human traffickers, human 
smugglers, thieves and contraband traders.”153 True, the Zetas do have some of their own 
personnel working in these industries, but it is less of a risk to have someone else do the 
dirty work on their behalf. 
In summary, Los Zetas is a special breed of Mexican DTO. Because they do not 
play by the rules of the clandestine industry like the other similarly sized organizations, it 
is relatively difficult to know what they are doing and thus difficult to categorize the 
organization properly. Unlike the Sinaloa DTO, which is a conglomerate power when it 
comes to drugs, Zetas do not hold a conglomerate power in the drug industry; yet, Los 
Zetas do hold conglomerate power overall through its usage of the smaller organization 
within their territories that do offer many diversified products and services that can be 
traced back to the Zetas. Due to this reason alone, it is hard to state that the only 
motivation for Los Zetas to diversify is to kill off other organizations within a territory. 
Since the business model of the Zetas prefers is for themselves to be independent, yet 
they still requires other, smaller organizations, such as local gangs and weaker DTOs, to 
make the actual sale of the illicit products and services on their behalf, the competition 
model hypothesis could be a strong contender in predicting the motivations for Los 
Zetas’ diversification.  
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Without a specific specialization of product offerings like the Sinaloa DTO, so 
far, Los Zetas has been successful at keeping in sync with the changing environment to 
meet their need to thrive and profit. When it comes to using the weak Mexican state to 
their advantage, Los Zetas’ conduct is nearly parallel to that of the Sinaloa DTO; they 
seek and find where the path of least resistant is within a given territory and bribe the 
officials to get their way. Likewise, as the globalization of the economy brings forth new 
                                                 
153 Ibid.  
 56 
technologies that requires specific natural resources—such as oil—Los Zetas are pulled 
into new means of diversification to meet the demand, all while cashing in the profits.  
The final analysis of the Zetas reveals that the organization in general is very 
similar to the Sinaloa DTO. Seeing that both Los Zetas and the Sinaloas are national-
level cartels, it is no surprise. However, as similar as they both are, Los Zetas, who are 
not as specialized as the Sinaloa DTO, will have to constantly rely on smaller, weaker 
organizations to earn their money. Thus, as much as Zetas would like to operate 
independently, the competition side of their business will have to always be ahead of 







IV. TIJUANA DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the Tijuana cartel’s past behaviors and its internal structure 
to delineate the similarities and differences of the cartel compared to the Sinaloas and Los 
Zetas. The purpose of comparing the Tijuana cartel to the Sinaloa and the Zetas cartel is 
to extract insights to help clarify why once a significantly successful organization has 
now lost its stance in the Mexican clandestine industry. The chapter first briefly goes 
over the Tijuana cartel’s background, internal structure, and followed by the testing of the 
hypothesis to determine if the lack of diversification has limited its continued success.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The Tijuana DTO, also known as the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), is a 
toll-collecting cartel, which in the past has been described by many as one of the most 
fruitful and ruthless criminal organization in Mexico. 154  The Tijuana cartel single-
handedly controlled the Tijuana plaza between the years of 1986 and 2002. The home of 
the cartel is Tijuana, a strategically located Mexican city comparable in size to Juarez. 
The territory is known to be a lucrative drug trafficking route going up to the United 
States, and this positioned the Tijuana cartel to become one of the most powerful 
Mexican cartels to be ever formed in Mexico.   
Experts note that the Tijuana cartel’s roots trace all the way back to the Mexican 
state of Sinaloa, where its founding members worked very closely with the legendary 
drug capo, Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo (“El Padrino”)—one of the founders of the 
legendary Guadalajara cartel. The recognition of the Guadalajara cartel is paramount in 
this context as that it was the Mexican cartel that eventually gave birth to many of the 
underground organizations seen in Mexico today.  Drug trafficking organizations such as 
the Sinaloa, Juarez, and the Tijuana were all splintered from the Guadalajara cartel.  
                                                 




More importantly, however, the rise and the initial success of the Tijuana cartel was the 
efforts of brothers, “Benjamin, Ramon, Francisco Rafael, Francisco Javier, [and] 
Eduardo,” 155 otherwise known as the Arellano Felix brothers. 
After the Tijuana cartel splintered from the Guadalajara cartel, the Arellano Felix 
brothers established themselves as the sole guardians of the Tijuana territory. 
Furthermore, the brothers quickly recognized they were ruling one of the most lucrative 
plazas leading into the United States, and so they initiated the collection of the piso from 
other organizations operating in their territory.156 In addition, they looked to expand into 
the surrounding border cities as a form of diversification. While the organization has had 
its share of ups and downs through the years leading up to 2002, mostly battling the 
Sinaloa cartel led by El Chapo Guzman, the rapid growth started to crumble quickly, and 
the Tijuana cartel found itself on the verge of extinction.  
In 2002, the Tijuana cartel made an effort to kill off the Sinaloa’s leaders and 
failed miserably, and this led to the downturn of the organization. Rather than 
successfully eliminating El Mayo of the Sinaloa cartel as planned, El Mayo’s hitmen 
were instead able to kill Benjamin Ramon. The death of Benjamin consequently left a 
vacuum in Tijuana DTO’s leadership hierarchy. Such vacuum eventually triggered more 
deaths and arrests for the Tijuana cartel leaders by both enemy DTOs and the state. As 
“DEA, FBI, and U.S. Attorney’s Office as well as many other federal, state, and local 
agencies joined forces to completely dismantle the leadership of the AFO,” 157  the 
combination of attacks on different fronts hampered the growth of the organization and 
its survival.  
The continued lack of functional leadership coupled with a lack of notable 
organization growth in due course led to internal disputes and in turn caused a shift in 
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balance of power among the clandestine DTOs. 158  The change in power paradigm 
through cartel fragmentation inevitably prevented the Tijuana cartel’s successful power 
projection outside of the Baja peninsula through conglomerate power, reduced it to a 
small toll-collecting organization that it is today.  
With the male leaders of the Tijuana cartel either in jail or killed, many speculate 
that Enedina Arellano Felix is now at the helm of the Tijuana cartel. As one of the sisters 
of the Arellano Felix’ family, she is known to be educated in corporate business, not drug 
trafficking. However, even with a new face to the organizational leadership, without 
much successful business diversification, experts believe that today’s Tijuana cartel is 
mere a puppet for other rival DTOs, such as the Sinaloa, that are the real controllers of 
the Tijuana territory.  
C. INTERNAL STRUCTURE 
The intriguing landscape of the Mexican cartel is something that scholars study 
continuously, as that clandestine landscape today can change in a blink of an eye. For the 
once powerful Tijuana cartel, seen as a centralized organization, ruled the lucrative 
Tijuana plaza for a time. It was once able to stash away millions of dollars and pay in the 
neighborhood of $75 million in bribes to state officials to impede investigations. 159 
Unlike many of other prominent DTOs in Mexico, such as the decentralized Zetas, the 
Tijuana cartel has mostly had a hierarchy of centralized command and control.160 This 
structure is not a favored one of today’s corporate business or even cartels as it lacks fail 
safe measures, such as flexibility and resiliency, built into its internal structure. 
The Tijuana cartel is built with the Arellano Felix family as the sole leaders of the 
organization, and it is the family members who make key decisions and judgments with 
no external influences. As undisputed leaders of the organization, the Arellano Felix 
family members decide and disseminate orders to a “council of advisors,” who then 
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control his or her own respective divisions below and carry out the individual orders.161 
Although it is relatively difficult to retrieve the most up-to-date information on the 
Tijuana cartel’s internal structure and knowing that the organization is not what it used to 
be, the historical studies show that each of the division of the organization is responsible 
for a specific task.  
In its heyday from the 1980s–2000, there were five main divisions of command in 
the Tijuana DTO that carried out the bulk of the organization’s tasks. The first division 
was responsible for intelligence and the infiltration of the governmental institutions and 
law agencies to gather secret intelligence—mostly through the means of bribery.162 The 
second division includes the sicarios (the assassins), who with orders from the top, use 
brutality and violence to remove obstacles and eliminate threats for rest of the cartel.163 
The money laundry falls under the third division, and the fourth division’s duties are 
logistics of drugs. Finally, the fifth division consisted of moles, who would gather 
intelligence from rival cartels for future planning purposes. 164  Figure 5 depicts the 
Tijuana cartel’s centralized hierarchy from the 1980s to 2000s. 
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Figure 5.  Tijuana DTO Internal Structure165 
 
 
An interesting fact regarding the Tijuana cartel structure is that at the height of 
domination throughout the 1980s and early 2000s, many experts believed that with the 
centralized hierarchy, the organization was in for the long run. Essentially, business was 
good due to the control and the family had the ability to make quick decisions. According 
to Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Despite the hierarchical structure of the cartel, and its 
strong centralized decision-making, the existence of a family . . . Means that the loss of 
one or two leaders can be sustained without affecting the cartel’s ability to control its 
operations and maintain revenues.”166  
Likewise, at the time of the cartel’s success, Arellano Felix family were initially 
able to defend off rival organizations because they had numerous family members who 
expertly knew their region and business. What differentiates the Tijuana DTO’s structure 
from a decentralized organization is that orders are given by a family member to each of 
the council of advisors to carry out. This is unlike a decentralized structure in which each 
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cell specializes in certain aspects of the business empire and makes decisions as it sees 
fit. In theory, a centralized command and control structure could be advantageous since 
the leaders would know everything that is happening within the organization and make 
the necessary changes to further their business growth. At the end of the day, growth 
typically dictates the organizations’ sustained success.167 However, on the other hand, 
limiting the vast, overall knowledge only to the leaders, the Arellano Felix family may 
have significantly restricted their potential growth, unlike in the case of the Sinaloa and 
the Zetas. Organizations such as the Sinaloa, were geared toward a more centralized 
hierarchy when they first formed have since adapted to the environmental changes into a 
decentralized organization. However, for the Tijuana cartel, the family members continue 
with a rigid structure and without much room for adaptability.  
D. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
Unlike the larger, decentralized Sinaloa and the Zetas in Chapters II and III, the 
Tijuana cartel is a small, centralized, drug trafficking organization, which makes it 
difficult to apply the hypotheses to it for testing. However, with the information that I 
was able to gather, my aim is to note some of the factors that limited the cartel’s 
motivation and ability for business diversification and find out why some of my 
hypotheses are not possible to be tested. 
1. The Competition 
The competition model speculates that the Tijuana cartel has already secured its 
place in a specific market and that the cartel tries forcefully to diversify into a new 
market to either to create an alliance or to drive-off another cartel to gain conglomerate 
power. However, since we already acknowledge that the Tijuana cartel has lost its place 
in the Mexican clandestine market, we can only observe the historical factors that 
potentially motivated them to diversify or prevented it from diversifying before its fall.  
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At the height of its success, the Tijuana cartel – was “considered one of the most 
powerful and violent drug trafficking organization in Mexico.” 168  Time Magazine 
speculated that at the height of the organization’s success, the brothers of the Arellano 
Felix family sat on top of a $30-billion drug trafficking industry; this is different from 
newer drug agencies, which have interests in diversifying. 169  Many experts also 
recognized the Tijuana DTO, at its peak, as being the best at the drug trafficking game.  
Distinguishing itself as the most ruthless and violent criminal organization in 
Mexico—and who to their advantage also owned the lucrative Tijuana plaza—it would 
be safe to state that the Tijuana cartel lacked the motivation to diversify into other types 
of business. Of course, just like any other criminal organizations, the Tijuana cartel had 
“diversified” into other means to launder money, but its diversification seems very 
minimal.  Noting only minimal records of Tijuana DTO’s diversification, it leads me to 
believe that the brothers did not have any real interest in diversifying outside of the 
family drug business. 
Furthermore, examining the period of the Tijuana cartel’s success sheds light on 
the cartel’s lack of diversification. The records show that at the peak of Tijuana cartel’s 
success in the drug smuggling business mostly falls before the year 2001. For anyone 
studying U.S. and Mexico border security issues, the year 2001 is important to note, as 
how the United States views the border security changed after the Al Qaeda’s terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001.  
The tightened border security after the terrorist attacks also made drug running for 
Mexican DTOs significantly more challenging. Compared to the security scrutiny today, 
before 2001 it was relatively easy for drug organizations to smuggle narcotics across the 
border. Granted, though both the U.S. and Mexico governments acknowledged that there 
were drug trafficking problems at the borders, nothing major was implemented to stop the 
clandestine criminal activities. In an interview conducted by Frontline with a drug 
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smuggler, when asked if it was easier to smuggle drugs across the border before 9/11, the 
smuggler said:  
From smuggling people, to smuggling drugs, to smuggling emeralds and 
diamonds. It was easier . . . After 9/11, everything was tight security. 
Nobody could work, at least for a couple of months. Nobody tried [to 
cross the border] because the people who tried failed.170  
All the bribing by the Tijuana DTO before 9/11 paid off. With special connections 
all throughout Tijuana and the bordering cities, for the Arellano Felix family, the drug 
smuggling business was easy money. They did not have any pressing reason to expand as 
long as they were at the top of the game. Before 9/11, for the Tijuana cartel, it was easier 
to continue trafficking drugs rather than to diversify its business growth through violent 
competition. 
Due to its failure to understand the concept of the conglomerate power, the 
Tijuana cartel also failed diversity its business as national level cartels do today. Because 
it thought it had a bright future in a very lucrative drug business and no one would dare 
challenge it, the Tijuana cartel made no investments as a backup for the drug business. 
However, as we will see later on, it was only matter of time before the organization was 
brought down by its stronger foes, who were preparing to attack at a moment’s notice. 
2. The Weak State 
The weak state hypothesis assumes that the capacity of the state to successfully 
combat or defend the illicit acts of the Tijuana DTO is insufficient. Thus, we witness an 
opportunity of business diversification within the organization. Knowing the current 
trend of the Tijuana cartel’s declining status, I examine the state’s capacity to bring down 
the once powerful drug trafficking organization.  
Formally known as the bribe king of Mexico, the Tijuana cartel sought out and 
took advantage of the weak state throughout the heyday of organization. When it was 
expanding, the cartel bribed its way to success in many cases, seeking every opportunity 
                                                 
170 “Extended Interview: A Human Smuggler,” Public Broadcasting Service, April 3, 2008, 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/mexico704/interview/smuggler.html.    
 65 
within the weak governmental system. If the bribing did not work, the Arellano Felix 
family used the sicarios and fear tactics to get what they wanted.  
The start of the degradation of the organization began with the accidental murder 
of the Mexican cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo by a couple of cartel members in a 
shootout at the Guadalajara airport in 1993. Benjamin Arellano Felix had ordered his 
sicarios to kill El Chapo Guzman to prevent his attempt to overtake the Tijuana drug 
corridor; however, Benjamin had bad intelligence, and the cardinal’s death was an 
unfortunate result at their attempt in killing El Chapo. In a country where 84 percent of 
its population is Catholic, the reckless killing of one of the church’s top authorities 
skyrocketed the Tijuana cartel to Mexico’s public enemy number one overnight.171 This 
action ended up nearly destroying the organization. 
The downfall of the cartel continued with the arrest of Javier Arellano Felix, who 
was the last brother apprehended in 2006 while he was fishing off the Mexican Baja 
California.172 Javier’s capture by the authorities put a stop to the organization’s chance of 
resilience because as a major player, his arrest led to widespread internal disputes—a sign 
of cartel’s weakness within the clandestine industry.173 His arrest also revealed the level 
of widespread bribery in which the cartel had been engaged.  
As a plea bargain deal with the authorities, Javier admitted that the family 
“repeatedly and willfully obstructed and impeded the investigation and prosecution of 
AFO activities” 174 by paying people off. And in some instances, if the bribes did not 
work, the family would simply commit murder to advance its business. Moreover, Javier 
admitted many other secrets to the authorities as part of the plea deal. He thoroughly 
explained the internal structures of his organization and other DTOs and how exactly the 
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organizations ran the drug business. In addition, he admitted that the organization would 
wiretap “rival drug traffickers and Mexican law enforcement officials in a similar fashion 
to legal authorities,” 175 to obtain a constant flow of intelligence. The Achilles heel of the 
Tijuana DTO was the knowledge of each brother had of the Arellano Felix family. Their 
vast understanding regarding the drug operation contrasted with the lack of operational 
knowledge of the organization’s members who were outside of the family. This 
considerably hindered the daily operations of the organization once the brothers were 
taken out of the picture.  
Mexico, with the help from the United States finally found the center of gravity 
(i.e., the weakness) of the cartel. Note, I am not stating that Mexico is now a strong state; 
I am just indicating that it was able to find the weak point of the Tijuana cartel and to 
prevent it from further taking advantage of the weak state system. Although the method 
of killing organizational leaders normally does not destroy decentralized DTOs, the 
leadership vacuum created by apprehending Arellano Felix brothers, who held all the key 
organizational knowledge, devastated the organization’s adaptability.  
The cartel’s inability to continue to take advantage of the weak state came when it 
lost the ability to be self-reliant; this was compounded by its lack of awareness of its own 
weakness. Situational awareness is essential in the Mexican clandestine business. The 
capability to infiltrate an enemy organization and law enforcement is the key success to 
keeping a clandestine, illicit business alive. An organization’s full awareness of the 
internal weakness structure within the organization is crucial, particularly for a 
centralized organization. The organization lost its sense of situational awareness 
regarding its essential need for competent leadership. As Bunck and Fowler explain:  
Twenty-first-century U.S. and Mexican law-enforcement efforts have 
diminished Tijuana; one brother (Francisco Rafael) was arrested in 1993, 
another (Ramon) was killed in 2002, a third (Javier) was arrested in 2006, 
and a fourth (Eduardo) was apprehended in 2008.176  
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One by one, the Tijuana DTO leaders were either killed or apprehended by the 
state. By losing its internal situational awareness, the organization lost the majority of its 
knowledgeable leaders and also its ability to be self-reliant.  The organization lost its 
sense of direction. Essentially, the lack of diversified business structure was slowly 
killing off its legitimacy within the clandestine landscape. 
3. Resource Exploitation and Push and Pull 
The lack of concrete evidence of the organization’s current, the most up-to-date 
information on its diversified business endeavors leads me to believe that either the 
interest of the Tijuana DTO among researchers is lacking or the cartel’s current goal is 
for survival, rather than trying to diversify for additional profits. Unlike the successful 
Sinaloa and Los Zetas DTOs, organizations that are still active through diversified 
activities, Tijuana DTO’s combination of variables—such as centralized internal structure 
and decimation of leadership—limited its operation mostly to drugs, especially cocaine, 
throughout its existence. This significantly limited any important researchable 
diversification. This narrow business mindset of the Tijuana leadership leads me to 
assume that the organization was, in fact, more concentrated in drug trafficking than 
exploring other diversified opportunities for further growth. 
With the understanding of past cases, such as Sinaloa’s diversification into 
methamphetamines, I can only assume that Arellano Felix brothers were not motivated to 
utilize their leftover resources from the cartel’s cocaine trafficking business to diversify. 
Likewise, as the Tijuana cartel was mostly a cocaine specialist, limited to their Tijuana 
area of responsibility, it is difficult to conclude whether it was truly motivated by the 
push or pull effect of the economic globalization. Compared to today’s diversified cartels, 
the leadership of the organization was very narrow-minded. It is possible that the Tijuana 
cartel was in fact influenced to diversify into other business by either resource 
exploitation or the push and pull model, but there is little evidence of it. Through my 
research, there was a consistent lack of evidence, leading me to believe that Tijuana DTO 
has not been motivated to diversify outside of its drug trafficking business to gain 
conglomerate power.   
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E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Experts proclaim that the current relative quietness of Tijuana plaza hints to the 
status of the Tijuana cartel. After the loss of many of its top leaders, it was not long 
before El Chapo and the Sinaloa DTO stepped in to overtake the lucrative corridor. After 
all, the base operation of drug trafficking and the ambition of the Tijuana cartel 
significantly “overlapped with those of the Sinaloa cartel, with which it has feuded.”177 
InsightCrime also confirms that the activities within the city also points to the dominance 
of the Sinaloa DTO.178 Furthermore, many agree that Tijuana cartel has made a truce 
with the Sinaloa to survive. In addition, many analysists conclude that Tijuana is a puppet 
for the Sinaloa and that only 15 percent of Tijuana territory is now run by what is left of 
the cartel.179 As seen in Figure 6, the insignificant size of the Tijuana cartel is evidenced 
when news agencies, such as the Agence France-Presse (AFP), now simply ignores the 
Tijuana DTO even in visualizations of the Mexican clandestine landscape. 
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Figure 6.  Landscape of the Mexican Drug Cartels in 2014180 
 
 
In some ways, the process of the Tijuana cartel explains that combination of 
events can cause a domino effect causing an organisation to fall. The once successful 
drug cartel lacked the capacity to adapt its internal organization to meet the everchanging 
Mexican clandestine landscape. Both the Tijuana and the Sinaloa DTOs initially started 
out as a splinter from the Guadalajara DTO as centralized organizations. While the 
Sinaloa DTO was adapting its command and control structure to meet the changing 
environment, the more decentralized organization, the Arellano Felix brothers—due to 
their overwhelming success of their cocaine business—were blinded in their sense of 
situational awareness to a point where resilience was nearly impossible.  
The Tijuana DTOs practice of fixating to one particular product (cocaine 
trafficking) ultimately led to the absence of successful product diversification. So, in the 
case of the Tijuana cartel, as it was mostly a drug trafficking organization, both the 
resource and the push and pull hypothesis is hard to test as there is a lack of detailed 
evidence of its diversification motives. For the competition and the weak state 
hypothesis, the failed attempts at the organization’s internal adaptability and to diversify, 
                                                 
180 Source: “AFP News Agency on Twitter: “Map of Mexico Showing Zones Controlled by Major 
Drug Cartels #infographic Http://t.co/SgW44cbLwD” Twitter, February 25, 2014, 
https://twitter.com/afp/status/438275150367051776.  
 70 
I conclude that nothing motivated the organization to diversify to further its profits. Due 
to the significant decline in the presence of the Tijuana cartel, the act of business 
diversification in their context is now not applicable. The organization’s current priority, 








In January 2016, Mexican authorities, with the help from the United States, 
recaptured Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman of the Sinaloa DTO for the third time. For 
Mexicans, the day was significant as President Enrique Peña Nieto cheerfully announced 
to the public, “Mission Accomplished,”181 noting that institutions once again had done its 
job placing a lead, criminal figure behind bars. By the same token, with continued 
incarceration of El Chapo, people expected a decline of Sinaloa DTO projected power 
throughout Mexico. However, unlike the public’s prediction, the cartel’s strong presence 
continued. This leaves us with a question of how the DTOs are continuously projecting 
power despite the absence of leadership and continued suppression from the state.  
My intention in this thesis has been to show that DTOs’ continued operation 
without their leadership is the result of organizational business diversification. The thesis 
identifies that DTOs’ motivation to diversify lies within the combination of their power 
to control the weak state, their will to capitalize on economic globalization, and desire to 
maximize their efficiency in using organization resources to attain much profit as 
possible. Moreover, the study has also confirmed that for a successful business 
diversification, a decentralized organization structure is indeed critical as confirmed by 
the resilient Los Zetas and the Sinaloans through their continued progression while their 
respectable leaders were either killed or incarcerated.  
The thesis emphasizes the importance of understanding corporate diversification 
to develop a framework for understanding the continued operation of the DTOs. 
Although a clear consensus is still lacking, in a simple form, a business diversification 
refers to a firm’s entry into a new market, through either an acquisition or an internal 
strategy, to equalize the strengths and weaknesses of its current operation for additional 
profit. Likewise, to offset the overall source of revenue, corporations occasionally are 
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motivated to venture into unrelated investments to obtain higher profit margins than they 
could otherwise achieve.182  
The three different DTOs examined in this thesis reveals various aspects of 
organizational operations within the Mexican clandestine landscape. Ultimately, the 
DTOs want to profit continuously from illicit transactions for growth. Both Sinaloa and 
Los Zetas DTOs, the two national level organizations, display an effective strategy to 
obtain growth through business diversification. By constantly altering their business 
operation to meet the changing licit and illicit business landscape, the Sinaloa and Los 
Zetas can directly discover new opportunities for growth. For an example, if there are 
possibilities for growth in the natural resource industry, thanks to industrialization in 
foreign countries, as DTOs, they are ready to make the necessary changes to diversify 
their business models to take on new challenges.  
On the other hand, the Tijuana DTO displays something entirely different from 
the two diversified DTOs do. From the beginning, the family-oriented organization 
specialized in the drug trafficking business in a specific region—Tijuana, Mexico. Unlike 
the more decentralized Sinaloa DTO, which was formed from the same fragmentation 
from the Guadalajara cartel, the Tijuana DTO never made an effort to transition its 
internal structure to prepare for business diversification. Moreover, due to the 
combination of the loss of opportunities concerning economic globalization and the lack 
of motivation to expand outside of the northwestern region of Mexico, the Tijuana DTO 
never seized the opportunities to diversify to distribute its revenue sources. 
B. COMPARING STRATEGIES AND DIFFERENT RESULTS 
The war on drugs directed by the Mexican officials is geared towards the 
destruction of the DTOs, and so far it has not been very effective. Over the years, starting 
with President Miguel Madrid in the 1980s, the subsequent president’s efforts to use hard 
power to quench the DTO efforts has to an extent been ignored by the DTOs (although 
the effort put forth by Calderon was most significant).183 Strategies, such as the “Safe 
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Mexico Plan” 184 unveiled by president Vicente Fox, to destroy the DTOs using hard 
power has not been as effective in stopping DTO continued profitability as the state 
originally intended. Through the research conducted for this thesis, the ongoing efforts of 
the Mexican government to contain the DTOs are very similar all across the board. 
However, my testing of the hypotheses explains that through rapid diversification, both 
the Sinaloa and Los Zetas DTOs have been able to profit continuously even while being 
suppressed by state authorities. On the other hand, the lack of definitive diversification of 
the Tijuana DTO greatly hindered its ability to project power and resulted in it being 
overtaken by the stronger, more diversified DTOs. 
Analyzing the historical events through the lens of three different DTOs: the 
Sinaloa, Los Zetas, and finally the Tijuana, I was able to test my hypotheses 
(competition, resource exploitation, weak state, and the push versus pull) to see if the 
DTOs are in fact more motivated to diversify if certain elements were present. Table 1 
compiles the findings of my research of the motivating factors influencing the DTOs to 
diversify.  
Table 1.   Motivating Factors of Diversification  
 
 
As seen in Table 1, the two decentralized DTOs, the Sinaloa and Los Zetas 
overall have been deeply influenced to diversify. Due to the their strong understandings 
of the resource exploitation (H1) and push versus pull (H2) opportunities, both the Sinaloa 
and the Zetas strategized to take advantage of the possibilities of different diversifications 
                                                 
184 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2010), 119.  
 74 
within their available means. We witness the DTOs success in diversification by their 
continuous ability to profit from their business even during heavy suppression by the 
state to shut them down.  
Overall, the basis of DTO diversification lies within the weak state of Mexico. As 
seen on Table 1, all three DTOs took advantage of the weak state (AH1). Due to this fact, 
I consider the weak state hypothesis as a background condition for any illicit 
diversification. However, I consider the weak state hypothesis as an alternative 
hypothesis knowing that the weak state element alone cannot be the sole explanation of 
DTO diversification as seen by non-diversified Tijuana DTO. The two primary 
hypothesis that requires attention in understanding what motivates the DTOs to diversify 
is the resource exploitation and the push versus pull. The two diversified DTOs, the 
Sinaloa, and Los Zetas, both effectively positioned themselves to make the resource 
exploitation and push versus pull as motivating factors for their need to diversify. Like 
so, because they effectively utilized the two factors as a motivating factors for 
diversification, their overall ability to leverage their revenues through diversification 
consistently brought in profits, even during heavy state suppression.  
On the contrary, the once-powerful Tijuana DTO never realized that its 
centralized family structure blinded its ability to quickly identify the given opportunities 
to diversify—unlike its decentralized competitors. Despite the Tijuana DTO’s initial 
success of using the weak state to its advantage during its initial growth, it made a critical 
mistake that has caused the organization to fall behind its competitors; it failed to adapt 
its internal structure to the changing landscape of the clandestine industry, thus firmly 
establishing business diversification to gain conglomerate power.185  
So far, the strategy of the Mexican government to limit the power projection of 
the DTOs has been to arrest members and to disrupt the drug market through what they 
called drug wars. As such, the Sinaloa and the Zetas DTO’s successful diversification 
into other means of businesses has yielded power through the act of cross-subsidization, 
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counteracting the pressures posed by the government.186 These two DTOs have been able 
to “use its profits from one market (sometimes known as ‘deep pockets’) to support 
predatory pricing activities in another.”187 Furthermore, as decentralized organizations, 
the ease of expansion through the delegation of power by the means of cellular networks 
also supports the maximization of their overall profitability unlike a more centralized 
organization (e.g., the Tijuana cartel), which tends to crumble when its top leaders are 
misplaced.  
The Tijuana DTO case is similar to that of a legal corporation that, mostly due to 
the market unpredictability, lacks a successfully diversified portfolio to create an 
effective cross-subsidization really hindered their overall success. In this age of 
globalization, this means that the organization’s chances of growth is minimal. This 
demonstrates that the process of business diversification is a critical aspect in DTO’s 
continued profitability. So far, the Mexican government’s strategy to combat the DTOs 
has not been discriminative toward any specific organization within the clandestine 
landscape. However, as seen in the cases of the three DTOs, despite the similar initial 
stages of growth, the organizations’ with the ability to diversify ultimately have had 
overall success in business profitability. 
C. THE APPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
As expressed throughout the chapters, the diversification process, and more 
importantly, the motivators that have influenced the DTOs to diversify, matter 
significantly. More importantly, as noted through the research, the current weakness of 
the Mexican state offers a perfect breeding ground for the DTOs to diversify. Many 
researchers agree that the rise of DTOs in Mexico is a real problem and requires 
resolution. Before the economic globalization, the DTO concerns were more localized; 
however, with the invention of technology through globalization, the rapid development 
of the clandestine organizations are causing havoc in not just Mexico but in countries all 
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around the world through the sale of illicit logistics—undermining the core economies of 
various countries.  
The current Mexican strategy of using hard power to contain DTOs only seems to 
aggravate the organizations to retaliate with more force and to diversify. According to an 
article by O’Neil in Foreign Affairs, “incarcerating individuals only briefly disrupts 
criminal operations, since people are swiftly replaced.”188 Knowing how modern DTOs 
employ rapid business diversification to adapt, the only way to successfully disrupt their 
means of projecting power is to hit them where it really hurts—their profits.  Legalization 
of marijuana in the United States is a good starting point for bankrupting the DTOs.  
However, as witnessed through the Sinaloa’s case, the DTOs are quick to diversify to 
equalize their profits. Scholars estimate that on average, the diversified Mexican DTOs 
generate some healthy $15 billion to $25 billion,189 annually—mostly through the sales 
of illegal products to the United States. With the ability to generate hefty profits annually, 
it is no shock that diversified DTOs are getting stronger year after year. As in the 
legitimate landscape, within the clandestine landscape, money is power. Thus, to contain 
DTOs’ future power projections, a primary goal of government entities need to be 
prediction of future opportunities for DTO diversification. This is an area that requires 
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